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FRANCES LEWIS LAW CENTER PROJECT
A FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF PERFORMANCE ART
AUTHOR MORAL RIGHTS*
"I'll have these players
Play something like the murder of my father,
Before mine uncle: I'll observe his looks;
I'll tent him to the quick; if he but blench,
I know my course.... [Tihe play's the thing,
Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the King."
Hamlet, act 2, sc. ii.
"Speak the speech, I pray you, as I pronounced it to You, trippingly
on the tongue."
Hamlet, act 3, sc. ii.
A young playwright, enrolled in a college graduate program, writes a
two act play and directs and produces the initial performance of his work
for the annual college theater festival. Funny, energetic, and a bit weird,
his play is the hit of the festival. Subsequently, the playwright agrees to a
more elaborate and "fully realized" production of his script, directed and
produced by a fellow graduate student. Halfway through the rehearsal
period, the playwright visits a rehearsal. He is shocked to discover that his
eccentric, funny work has been twisted into a turgid, overly serious "soap-
opera." The playwright protests and demands that the director stage his
play in accordance with the manifest intent contained in the playwright's
script. The director refuses, claiming the right to interpret and stage the
author's play as the director sees fit. On opening night, prior to the
commencement of the play, the playwright disavows the production to the
discomforted audience.
Another example of college art students taking themselves too seriously?
Perhaps; however, the incident graphically illustrates a conflict between the
authors and interpreters of performance art' that extends well beyond the
* This article and accompanying model legislation were the product of a 1990-91
Frances Lewis Law Center fellowship awarded to the author. The author wishes to thank
Professors Doug Rendleman, Brian Murchison and Sally Wiant for their patience and invaluable
assistance. A special thank you is extended to Helen Konrad. Her thoughts and suggestions
have added immeasurable worth to this article.
1. For the purposes of this paper, "performance art" or "performing art" means a
fixed, self-contained artistic creation that also acts as its author's intended guide for individuals
to perform the work. Examples of performance art include, but are not limited to, sheet
music, play scripts and video taped or filmed choreography. See J. MIntER, SUBSEQUENT
PEarORmANcEs 34 (1986) (stating that text of work of performance art exists in two capacities:
(1) as guide to produce performance; and (2) as authenticating device whose purpose is to
provide system of identification that allows one to say that particular performance is instance
of work in question).
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academic environment. Indeed, the conflict between authors and interpreters
of performance art at one time or another has affected much of the
professional performance art community.
2
One of the most dramatic manifestations of this conflict began in 1984
when the Boston American Repertory Theater (Boston ART) purchased the
rights to produce Samuel Beckett's "Endgame. ' 3 Pursuant to these rights,
the Boston ART staged a production of "Endgame" that allegedly made
significant departures from Mr. Beckett's script.4 Instead of setting the play
in a bare, cell-like room, as specified in Mr. Beckett's script, the Boston
ART set the play in an abandoned subway tunnel with a bombed out
subway car extending halfway across the stage.5 The Boston ART also cast
two black actors to perform characters specifically described as white in
Mr. Beckett's script. 6 At one point during the play these actors froze silently
in place while their lines were spoken out over an amplified sound system
emanating from the rear of the theater.7 Finally, instead of the specified
silence preceding the play's beginning, the Boston ART added an overture
that Phillip Glass composed.8 Beckett asserted that these changes violated
his rights as the author of "Endgame." 9
Mr. Beckett is not the only notable professional playwright to object
to novel interpretations of his works.' 0 Playwrights Sam Shepard and Edward
Albee strenuously have objected to certain productions of their respective
plays." Nor are playwrights the only performance art authors that have
complained about subsequent recreations of their works.' 2 Recently the
Holst estate objected to a synthesized version of Holst's "The Planets,"' 3
and in 1948 two Russian composers brought suit against Twentieth Century-
Fox for using their symphonic music as a soundtrack to an "anti-russian"
movie.14
2. See infra notes 3-14 and accompanying text (discussing various examples of conflict
between performance art authors and interpretive artists).
3. Freedman, Playwrights Debate Staging, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1985, at C21, col. 1.
4. Garbus & Singleton, Playwright-Director Conflict: Whose Play Is It Anyway?,
Brooklyn L.J., Dec. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
5. Id. at 21, col. 3.
6. Freedman, supra note 3, at C21, col. 1.
7. Garbus & Singleton, supra note 4, at 2, col. 1.
8. Freedman, supra note 3, at C21, col. 1.
9. Id. at 21, col. 1.
10. See infra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing other playwrights who have
objected to interpretations of their plays).
11. See Freedman, supra note 3, at C21, col. I (Shepard disowns New York Shakespeare
Company production of his play "True West"); N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1984, at 7, col. I (Albee
objects to stock company's all male cast of "Who's Afraid of Virginia Wolfe").
12. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing performance art authors,
other than playwrights, who have objected to interpretations of their works).
13. Moral Rights-Practical Perspectives, 14 CoLuM. J.L. & ARTs 25, 51 (1989) [here-
inafter Practical Perspectives].
14. Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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The above described incidents all involve a conflict that pits performance
art authors-playwrights, composers and choreographers-against the inter-
pretive artists-directors, conductors and choreographers-who stage the
authors' works."5 The authors of performance art are asserting a right to
control the use of their work to protect the artistic vision they have imbued
in their work, while the interpretive artists are claiming the right to control
the author's work to communicate their own artistic vision.1
6
This article will fully explore the nature of the contest for control
between the authors and interpreters of performance art. In addition the
article will attempt to arrive at a federal statutory resolution to the dispute.
More specifically, this article first will concern itself with accurately defining
the right that the authors of performance art are asserting. 7 Second, the
article will explore some of the existing analogues for the author's moral
right that presently exist within the American legal system. 8 Third, the
article will discuss the constitutional difficulties that are involved in any
federal statutory recognition of this author's right.' 9 Fourth, the article will
attempt to delineate fully the various interests involved in such a legislative
recognition." Finally, the article will conclude with a detailed discussion of
how these interests satisfactorily can be incorporated into specific statutory
provisions. 21
I. DEFnqrNG TE PERFORMANCE ART AuTHoR's "MoRAL RIGHT"
Because all artists have impressed their thoughts and feelings, their
inner being, into their art, artists want to control the presentation of their
work.22 Artists are not the only creators who materialize themselves in their
creations, but because the artistic mediums are subject to relatively few
constraints of economy, efficiency, and physical environment, artists can
inject more of their personalities into their creations than can the creator
of a drill press.23 To restate the proposition, when an engineer uses the
15. See Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 347-48
(1988) (describing conflict between performance art authors and interpretive artists).
16. Id. at 347-48 (describing conflict between performance art authors and interpretive
artists).
17. See infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text (defining right that authors of perform-
ance art are asserting).
18. See infra notes 35-154 and accompanying text (exploring American analogues to
performance art author's moral right).
19. See infra notes 155-418 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional difficulties
surrounding federal statutory recognition of the performance art author moral right).
20. See infra notes 419-44 and accompanying text (discussing various interests involved
in federal recognition of performance art author moral rights):
21. See infra notes 445-520 and accompanying text (discussing how involved interests
can be incorporated into specific statutory provisions).
22. See Amarnick, American Recognition of the Moral Right: Issues and Options, 29
COPYIHT L. SYmp. (ASCAP) 31, 36-37 (1983) (discussing artist's act of impressing personality
into art).
23. Hughes, supra note 15, at 342.
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physical laws of the universe to design a successful drill press, the very
Newtonian laws that are the key to designing the drill press also are the
constraints that prevent the creator from instilling his own personality into
his creation.2 Conversely, when an artist uses his human spirit to guide his
creating, the constraints of economy, efficiency and physical environment
do not impede the impression of his personality into his artistic creation.2
The artist's freedom to inject his personality into his art is a double-
edged sword, however. Because an artist's art largely is free from the
constraints of economy, efficiency and physical environment, individuals
other than the artist can easily distort or change the art.26 If an individual
distorts or changes the artist's art, then the individual changes the artist's
manifestation of his personality, and thereby wounds the artist's feelings. 27
Thus, the plethora of personality in art, in concert with the fragility of its
manifestation explains why artists attempt to control the presentation of
their art and justifies recognition of the unique right of artists to protect
the manifestations of their personalities from distortion by others: an artist's
moral right.
2
24. See id. at 342-43 (describing constraints of economy, efficiency and physical envi-
ronment that affect creation of intellectual property).
25. However, cultural limitations may govern the course and form of an artist's creations.
See BLOTNER, Continuity and Change in Faulkner's Life and Art, in FAULKNER & IDEAU SM
15 (1983) (discussing effect of cultural conditions on form and course of William Faulkner's
writings).
26. See Hughes, supra note 15, at 342-43 (describing constraints of economy, efficiency
and physical restraints that affect creation of intellectual property). Because performance art
only is realized fully through the contributions of individuals other than the author, such as
directors, conductors, choreographers, actors, musicians and dancers, the risk of distortion is
acute especially for the author's of performance art. See J. MILLER, supra note 1, at 33
(stating that performance art is only complete when performed).
27. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 37 (citing Radojkovic, The Legal Character of
"Moral Right, " COPYRIGHT 203 (1965)).
28. See id. (describing author's manifestation of his personality into his art); Hughes,
supra note 15, at 342-43 (describing constraints on creation of intellectual property). This
conception of the moral right is essentially a recognition that distortions to an artist's work
harm the artist's psyche. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 37 (describing effect of distortion
on artist) (quoting Note, Protection of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Companies, 90 HARv. L. REV. 473, 477 (1976)). This approach is distinct from that taken by
many commentators and national legislative schemes that link moral rights to the artist's
economic interests in his work. See S. LADAs, Tim INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY
AND ARTsTIc PROPERTY, 576 (1938) (describing economic conception of moral rights); S.
RIcKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WoRKs:
1886-1986 473-74 (1987) (describing economic conception of moral rights); Note, Protection
of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v. ABC, 90 HAav. L. REV. 473, 477 (1976) (same). The economic
approach to moral rights attaches approbation only to those distortions that decrease the
marketability of an artist's work. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 37 (same). Further, the
economic approach measures decreases in an artist's marketability by measuring the harm to
the artist's reputation resulting from a distortion to the artist's art. See id. (same).
Supplying a remedy that redresses distortions harming the artist's economic interests
tangentially may prevent harm to the artist's psyche. See id. (noting close relationship between
1582
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Theorists have broken the moral right into a multiplicity of subparts,
but for the purposes of this article, the moral right will be divided only
into rights of paternity and integrity. 29 Such a subdivision accords with the
terms of the Berne Convention (Berne)3 0 which the United States Congress
adopted in part on October 12, 1988. 31 The paternity right encompasses the
artist's right to be known as the author of his work. 32 Commentators further
subdivide the paternity right into the artist's right to prevent others from
being named the author of his work, and conversely, the right to prevent
others from falsely attributing authorship to the artist of art that the artist
has not created. 33 The right of integrity encompasses the artist's right to
prevent others from making deforming changes to his work.
34
moral interests and economic interests). However, the scope of protection that the economic
approach to moral rights affords is more limited than the personality approach to moral
rights. See id. (recognizing artists' difficulty in obtaining relief based upon economic approach).
Due to the slight market demand for most art, many artists lack an ascertainable artistic
reputation. See Davis, Fine Art and Moral Rights: The Immoral Triumph of Emotionalism,
17 HoFsRA L. Rnv. 317, 358 (1989) (describing difficulties in measuring artist's reputational
damage). Thus, under most economic moral right schemes, artists will not possess a recognizable
economic interest in their work. See id. (same); see also Tamarind Lithography Workshop,
Inc. v. Sanders, 143 Cal. App. 3d 576-77, 578, 193 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1983) (observing difficulty
in quantifying lost profits when film owner refuses to give film producer contracted screen
credit). As a result, though a distortion still will harm an artist's psyche, the artist will lack
the means to redress the distortion. Id. A personality based approach to moral rights redresses
any distortion that harms the artist's psyche, independent of any existing economic interest of
the artist. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 37 (describing personality approach to moral
rights); Davis, supra, at 358 (describing difficulties in measuring artist's reputational damage).
29. Traditionally, the moral rights doctrine has encompassed two additional rights: The
right of disclosure and the right of withdrawal. See 2 M. Nnonx & D. NnnaR, NnsRa ON
CoPYRUonrr: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MusiCAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND
THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 8.21[A], at 8-248 (1990) [hereinafter M. NMER] (describing right
of withdrawal and disclosure). The right of disclosure gives the artist the right, prior to the
time he places his art into public circulation, to determine both the form of the art and the
time and manner that the art will be disclosed. See Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is
an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. Ray. 1, 5 (1985) (citing Sarraute, Current
Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. ComP. L.
465, 467 (1968)). The right of withdrawal encompasses the artist's right to withdraw a work
from public circulation if it no longer represents the views of the artist. See M. N1mER,
supra, at 8-248 (describing right of withdrawal).
30. Berne Convention (Paris Text), art. 6bis(l) [hereinafter Berne]. Article 6bis(1) of the
Berne Convention states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object
to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which shall be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
31. Berne. Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 3(b), 102
Stat. 2853, 2853-54 (1988) [hereinafter BCIA].
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II. PROTECTING THE MORAL RIGHTS OF PERFO RmANCE ART AUTHoRs-
THE SUFICIENCY OF AMERICAN ANALOGUES
Europe and a large part of the Third World long have incorporated
into their respective common-law and legislative schemes some form of
moral rights protection for artists, including the authors of performance
art.35 Within America, however, legal recognition of the moral rights doctrine
has been much more recent and limited in scope. 6 State and federal courts
never have recognized artists' moral rights. 37 State legislatures have recog-
nized the doctrine, but they have limited its reach to the creators of visual
art. 8 Congress has followed the lead of these state legislatures and limited
its recognition of moral rights to the creators of visual art. 39 Thus, within
the United States, a performance art author finds no explicit, legal recog-
nition of his moral rights.40
When Congress enacted the Berne Convention in 1988,41 it had the
opportunity to institute the kind of inclusive moral rights protection that
35. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 97-100 (listing scope of moral rights protection in 35
countries).
36. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (citing state and federal law that has
accorded moral rights protection to visual art artists).
37. See Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (noting lack of persuasive
case law supporting notion of moral rights); Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 70-71, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578-79 (1948) (explaining difficulty in applying
doctrine of moral right), aff'd, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949). But cf. Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (suggesting that
if individual excessively mutilates or alters creator's work, creator may have enforceable non-
economic rights); Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2nd Cir. 1976) (considering implicit
support for artist's integrity rights). See also infra note 73 (explaining construction of Gilliam
recognizing author's moral right).
38. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991) (granting paternity and integrity
rights to creators of "original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of fine art
in glass); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s (West 1991) (granting paternity and integrity
rights to creators of visual art including, but not limited to, "drawing; painting; sculpture;
mosaic; photograph"); LA. REv. STAT. Am. § 51:2152 (West 1987) (granting paternity and
integrity rights to creators of any "work of visual or graphic art"); ME. Rxv. STAT. tit. 27,
§ 303(1)(D) (1988) (granting paternity and integrity rights to creators of "any original work
of visual or graphic art"); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b) (West Supp. 1991)
(granting paternity and integrity rights to creators of "any original work of visual or graphic
art of any media"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-3e (West 1987) (granting paternity and integrity
rights to creators of "any original work of visual or graphic art"); N.Y. ARrs & CuLT. An'.
LAw § 11.01.9 (McKinney 1991) (granting paternity and integrity rights to creators of any
"painting, sculpture, drawing, or work of graphic art, and print"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §
2102 (Purdon Supp. 1991) (granting paternity and integrity rights to creators of an "original
work of visual or graphic art"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-62-2(e) (1987) (granting paternity and
integrity rights to creators of "any original work of visual or graphic art").
39. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 601, 104 Stat. 5128
(1990) [hereinafter JIA] (according visual artists moral rights). Congress' 1990 enactment of
moral rights legislation for visual artists has been the sole federal recognition of the moral
rights doctrine. See id. (limiting federal moral rights protection to visual artists).
40. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing limited extent of American
moral rights recognition).
41. BCIA, supra note 31, at 2853-54.
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would have encompassed the moral rights of performance art authors.42
Specifically, Congress could have given full effect to the complete text of
Berne, including section 6bis(1), the moral rights provision protecting the
paternity and integrity rights of all artists. 43 Instead Congress chose to adopt
Berne without giving effect to section 6bis(1), stating that section 6bis(1)
did not expand or reduce any right of an author to assert attribution or
integrity rights." Congress justified its limitation on its enactment of Berne
with the rationale that existing American statutory and common-law already
accorded moral rights protection equivalent to that accorded by section
6bis(1).
41
The limitations that Congress placed on its enactment of Berne have
forced authors of the performing arts to find moral rights protection in the
statutory and common-law that Congress described as analogues to moral
rights." These moral rights analogues include causes of action for breach
of contract, libel, invasion of privacy, unfair competition and copyright
infringement4 7 Despite Congress' apparent belief in the sufficiency of these
analogues, commentators uniformly have found them ill-equipped to prop-
erly protect artists' moral rights." Because unfair competition, breach of
contract and copyright infringement actions particularly are prevalent in the
context of the performance arts, the ability of these analogues to protect
the personality interests of performance art authors deserves closer atten-
tion.4
9
42. See Berne, supra note 30, at 6bis(1) (containing language establishing integrity and
paternity rights provisions).
43. See id. (same).
44. BCIA, supra note 31, at 2853-54.
45. See Final Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention, 10 CoLum. J.L. & ARTs 513, 555 (1986) (stating that U.S. provides moral rights
analogues sufficient to comply with paternity and integrity provisions of Berne) [hereinafter
Final Report].
46. See id. (insisting that United States provides moral rights analogues sufficient to
comply with paternity and integrity provisions of Berne).
47. See M. NImnsR, supra note 29, § 8.21[B], at 8-257 (noting causes of action recognizing
substance of moral rights); Kwall, supra note 29, at 18 (same); Note, Author's Moral Rights
in the United States and the Berne Convention, 19 STmrsoN L. REV. 202, 212 (1989) (same).
48. See M. NnamR, supra note 29, § 8.21[B], at 8-257 (stating that "it may not be said
that ... [the development of analogues for moral rights] has brought to America authors
moral rights protection in the full bloom of its European counterpart"); Amarnick, supra note
22, at 61 (noting that "it is necessary to remember that American protection [of moral rights]
is a melange of doctrines and statutes whose goals are not specifically those of giving recognition
to" artist's personality interests in his work); Kwall, supra note 29, at 37 (recognizing that
"copyright law cannot function as an adequate moral right substitute"); Note, Artists' Rights
in the United States: Towards Federal Legislation, 25 HARv. J. ON LEois. 153,, 180 (1988)
[hereinafter Note] (stating that "all that American creators currently possess to protect their
rights in their work is a patchwork of federal and state actions that do not nearly approximate
the cohesive protections that would be afforded by an explicit amendment to the copyright
laws providing artists with moral rights protection") (citing Amarnick, supra note 22, at 60-
71).
49. See Garon, Director's Choice: The Fine Line Between Interpretation and Infringement
1991] 1585
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In general, of all artists, performance art authors have the closest
approximation to a contractual form of moral rights when they contract
with interpretive artists and producers 0 At least some performance art
authors, as a group or individually, have the bargaining power to reserve
expressly in the assignments or licenses for their works the right to prevent
distortion or truncation of their works-a contractual right analogous to
the performance art author's right of integrity." Courts have long recognized
and enforced such express reservations.1
2
An example of such an express reservation is the prohibition against
distortion or truncation contained in the "Approved Production Contract"
(APC), a contract used by playwrights belonging to the Dramatist Guild.
3
The APC is a mandatory contract between the playwright and the producer
that governs the first production of the playwright's script . 4 The contract
provides that no interpretive artist or producer can make changes to the
playwright's script without the playwright's prior approval." Further, the
APC specifies that the playwright does not have to be reasonable in refusing
to make such changes to his script.5 6 Similar to the playwright's APC
provisions, choreographers often enter into contractual agreements with
producers and interpretive artists that reserve quasi-integrity and paternity
rights.57 For instance, these choreography contractual agreements typically
of an Author's Work, 12 COLUM. J.L. & ARrs 277, 287-303 (1988) (discussing value of
copyright, unfair competition and contract law to playwrights); Singer, In Search of Adequate
Protection for Choreographic Works: Legislative and Judicial Alternatives vs. The Custom of
the Dance Community, 38 U. ML w L. REv. 287; 295-97 (1984) (discussing value of copyright
and contract law to choreographers).
50. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing strong contractual provisions
against alterations existing within performance art industry).
51. See Garon, supra note 49, at 278 (stating that Broadway playwrights often have
strong contractual protections against alterations due to mandatory Dramatist Guild contract);
Singer, supra note 49, at 294-95 (stating that choreographer's licensing agreement often will
have provision forbidding alterations to choreographer's work); Practical Perspectives, supra
note 13, at 43 (stating that Broadway playwrights often have strong contractual protections
against alterations due to mandatory Dramatist Guild contract).
52. See Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 262 F. 811, 815 (1919) (stating that
provision of contract licensing play for movie adaptation, providing that, "no alterations,
eliminations, or additions to be made in the play without approval of the author," prohibits
changes that constitute substantial deviation from locus of play, or order and sequence of
development of plot); Royle v. Dillingham, 53 Misc. 383, 385 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (providing that
license authorizing production of play that provides "no changes or alterations in the said
play ... shall be made without consent of the [author]", held to permit injunction against
licensee from making unauthorized changes and modifications in text and structural arrange-
ment of play).




57. See Singer, supra note 49, at 294-95 (describing terms of choreographer licensing
agreement).
1586
PERFORMANCE ART AUTHOR RIGHTS
reserve the choreographer's right to forbid any alteration to his work without
his prior approval.
58
While the above described contractual provisions appear to protect the
personality interests of the performance art author, at best, reliance on
contract is a chewing gum and bailing wire approach to protecting these
interests.5 9 The principal difficulty with the contractual analogue is that
economic forces compel even the authors of performance art to waive their
personality rights, 60 and the courts consistently have upheld such waivers. 6'
In addition the entrepreneurs of the performance art industry have a decided
bargaining advantage that performance art authors find hard to counter.
62
Organizations such as the Dramatist Guild may provide effective contractual
protection for the artist's personality interests,6 however, these protections
are only available to Dramatist Guild's members.64 Additionally, the vast
majority of choreographers and composers do not belong to any comparable
organization. 65 Thus, most performance art authors are placed in an unequal
bargaining position with respect to protecting their personality interests and,
as a result, are forced to waive their rights."
Even if a performance art author manages to secure contractual pro-
visions protecting his personality interests, the author still faces the difficulty
of protecting his personality interests from the virtually unlimited number
58. Id. at 295.
59. See infra notes 60-88 and accompanying text (describing difficulties in using contact
law as analogue for performance art author moral rights).
60. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 27 (stating that "unknown creators face disparity of
bargaining power that frequently results in loss of protections"); Singer, supra note 49, at 296
(stating that choreographer may not possess bargaining power to insure sufficient contractual
provisions); Practical Perspectives, supra note 13, at 43 (stating that economic pressures often
force playwrights to consent freely to changes despite reservation of strong contractual rights).
61. See Autry v. Republic Prods., 213 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
858 (1954) (holding that licensing agreement that allows licensee to cut, edit and otherwise
revise in any manner, to any length and for any purpose, prevents licensor from bringing
claim for such editing); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that
contract for sale of master recordings, encoded in 78 format, allowed assignee to issue copies
of master recording in 33 format); Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522, 525-26 (7th Cir. 1947)
(holding that where artist sells copyright to his art and assigns use of his name in connection
with art and all rights with respect to his name, including but not limited to tight to dispose
of his name, the artist has no interest that allows him to assert right to attribution).
62. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 27 (stating that performance art authors often have
disparate bargaining power that makes it difficult to obtain protective provisions). The
performance art entrepreneur possesses a strong bargaining position versus performance art
authors due to the vast amount of performance art that is available to the entrepreneurs. See
also C. GRODIN, IT WoUmL BE So NICE IF You WEREN'T HERE 183-84 (1989) (describing
screenwriter's difficulties in trying to get his screenplays and plays produced).
63. Garon, supra note 49, at 278 n.7.
64. Id.
65. See Singer, supra note 49, at 293-94 (stating that interpretive artist and producing
organizations directly negotiate contracts with choreographer or choreographer's representative).
66. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 27 (noting court's reluctance to extend protections on
contractual basis); Singer, supra note 49, at 296; Practical Perspectives, supra note 13, at 43
(noting economic pressures that prevent author from exercising control over work).
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of wrongful acts falling outside the specific terms of the contract.67 For
example, absent an express contractual provision prohibiting a particular
form of modification, the courts will follow one of two equally nonbeneficial
courses. 6 They either will rely on the custom prevailing in the performance
art industry to evaluate liberally the suitability of modifications falling
outside the contractual terms, 69 a determination that obviously will favor
the interpretive artist, or the courts simply will allow the modification
because the contract does not expressly prohibit that particular type of
change.
70
To further illustrate, a licensing agreement between the author and a
producer may prohibit modifications to the dialogue of a play, the chore-
ography of a ballet or the score of an orchestral work. However, a skillful
artist performing the work could make dramatic interpretive changes that
would not modify the "text" of the work in any way.7' For instance, an
interpretive artist could turn a tragic work into a farce merely by exagger-
ating the emotional range of his performance or by speaking his lines with
an unintended irony.72 While the "modifications" might harm the author's
personality interests, the changes may be beyond the purview of contract
law, due to the omission of an express prohibition against changing the
tone of the work.73
67. See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text (describing difficulties performance art
authors face when attempting to enforce contractual provisions protecting moral rights).
68. See supra notes 61-67, supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
approaches to contractual provisions protecting performance art author's moral rights).
69. See Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 269 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (1966) (holding
that because license to distribute film for television makes no prohibition against cutting film
for television, distributor could cut in accordance with custom prevailing in trade and industry);
Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 270 Cal. App. 2d 886 (1969) (failing to find specific
grant of rights to prevent assignee from deleting portions for television, court only enjoined
editing that would constitute severe emasculation or material distortion).
70. See McGuire v. United Artists Television Prod., Inc., 254 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal.
1966) (holding that where contract for sale transferred all of artist's rights, title and interest
in film, nothing barred owner from cutting film for television to accommodate commercials).
71. See S. RICK-TSON, supra note 28, at 468-69 (noting that competent actor can transform
farce into tragedy).
72. Id.
73. Some commentators have suggested that the 1976 United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit opinion, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1976), radically may have diverted from the traditional contract rule that a court will
only give effect to an express provision in a licensing agreement between an author and a
producer. M. NinMER, supra note 29, at 260; Kwall, supra note 29, at 21. These commentators
suggest that Gilliam may stand for the proposition that where a contractual agreement between
a copyright owning author and a producer is silent as to the personality rights of the author,
specifically the author's integrity rights, the author will retain those integrity rights. M.
NIMMR, supra note 29, at 260-61; Kwall, supra note 29, 21 & 34-35.
In Gilliam the Monty Python comedy group wrote and delivered copyrighted scripts to
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in accordance with an agreement providing that
no significant changes could be made to the scripts without the express permission of Monty
Python. 538 F.2d at 17. The agreement further provided that Monty Python retained all rights
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Assuming that performance art authors do have the bargaining power
and the legal acumen to draft effective contractual provisions to protect
their personality interests, the enforcement of these contractual rights will
continue to remain difficult for most authors. 74 First, the cost of pursuing
a breach of contract action prevents most artists from enforcing what
contractual protections they do have." Second, the remedies available to a
performance art author for breach of a contract are limited and possibly
ineffective.m 76 The typical award for breach of contract is compensatory
not expressly granted in the agreement. Id. The BBC subsequently assigned a completed Monty
Python program to Time Life Films who then distributed the program to the American
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) for American broadcast. Id. at 17-18. In accordance with
the terms of the BBC/Time Life contract, permitting substantial editing of the program, ABC
excised 24 minutes from the 90 minute program. Id. The Second Circuit ultimately held that
ABC infringed on Monty Python's common law copyright in its script because Monty Python
had not empowered BBC and its sublicensees "to alter" the program "once made." Id. at
21. Thus, by significantly editing the Monty Python program, ABC exceeded the scope of the
license that Monty Python indirectly granted ABC through BBC and Time Life Films. Id.
One reading of Gilliam is that because Monty Python expressly reserved all righfs not
expressed in its agreement with BBC, it retained the right to prohibit any significant changes
to programs derived from its script. Kwall, supra note 29, at 21 & 34-35; see also Gilliam,
538 F.2d at 22 (stating that because screenwriter's agreement explicitly retains all rights not
granted by contract, omission of any terms concerning alterations in program after recording
must be read as reserving to licensor exclusive authority for such revisions). Such a reading
of Gilliam does not suggest that the Second Circuit deviated from the accepted principle of
contract law that retained rights must be reserved expressly in the contract.
Professor Nimmer, however, finds the reservation clause in the Monty Python/BBC
agreement irrelevant and reads Gilliam in a broader fashion. M. NIMR, supra note 29,
§ 8.21[], at 8-260 n.63. "[A]bsent an express authorization to make changes, the license to
... perform is limited to ... performance in the form in which the authors wrote the work,
so that a material departure from such form goes beyond the terms of the license, and hence
results in an infringement of [copyright]." Id. at 260-61. Such a reading does two things.
First, it recognizes that authors who retain their copyrights essentially have some form of an
integrity right that prohibits mutilations to the author's work. Secondly, Professor Nimmer's
reading of Gilliam turns the express reservation rule on its head by suggesting that, absent a
provision to the contrary, when an author confers a performance license for the work that is
silent as to the author's integrity rights, the license only confers the right to perform the piece
as supplied. Id. The right to mutilate the work remains solely with the copyright owning
author. Id. at 261.
Even if one accepts Professor Nimmer's reading of Gilliam, the case's usefulness to
performance art authors is limited. Gilliam links the author's integrity right to the author
owning the work's common law copyright. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21 (stating that "we find
therefore, that unauthorized editing of the underlying work, if proven, would constitute an
infringement of the copyright"). Thus, absent copyright ownership, Gilliam may not afford a
performance artist any integrity right. Id. Certainly Gilliam does not hold that the author will
have such a right if the contract between the author and the producer is silent with regard to
making significant changes to the work. Id.
74. See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (describing difficulties facing perform-
ance art author trying to enforce contractual provisions that protect author's moral rights).
75. Singer, supra note 49, at 296.
76. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (describing limited usefulness of remedies
for breach of contract).
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damages based on some kind of lost profits analysis.77 In many cases, a
paternity or integrity rights violation causes serious harm to the author's
personality interests but results in little or no quantifiable lost profits for
the author. 78 While injunctive relief may be available, 79 such relief could
create serious First Amendment difficulties ° and could be extremely destruc-
tive for the fragile entrepreneurial aspects of the performance art industry. 8'
Similar to the illusionary protections of contract law, federal copyright
law initially appears to afford substantial protection to the performance art
author's personality interests. 2 These protections basically take the form of
two copyright privileges: the exclusive rights to do and authorize the (1)
public display and performance of the copyrighted work 3 and (2) derivative
works based on the copyrighted work. 4 In addition to these two basic
statutory rights, commentators have suggested that Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Co., Inc.'5 recognized a third "integrity type" right that
authors have in their copyrighted works-the right to prevent unauthorized
mutilations to their works.86
Commentators have argued that, in a number of fashions, these statu-
tory and common-law copyright protections approximate moral rights pro-
tection for authors of performance art.8 7 First, an author who has granted
a performance license can bring an action for copyright infringement if the
licensee performs such a modified version of the author's work that it
constitutes a derivative version88 of the author's work. 9 In effect the licensee
77. See J. CALAMAPi & J. PagnaTo, CONTRACTS, § 14-4 (3rd ed. 1987) [hereinafter J.
CALAMARI].
78. See Tamarind Lithography Workshop v. Sanders, 143 Cal. App. 3d 571, 578, 193
Cal. Rptr. 409, 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that lost profits are difficult to quantify
when film owner refused to give film producer contracted screen credit).
79. See id. at 578, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (ordering film owner to abstain from showing
film until owner gave film's producer his contracted screen credit); see also J. CAIaMI,
supra note 77, at § 16-1.
80. See infra notes 289-299 and accompanying text (discussing potential First Amendment
difficulties ensuing from enjoining moral rights violations).
81. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 40 & 53 (discussing effect of injunctions on
performance art industry); see also infra notes 294-299 and accompanying text (discussing
economic hardship on performance art industry from enjoining moral rights violations).
82. See infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text (discussing protections copyright law
affords performance art author's moral rights).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) & (5) (Supp. 1990).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (Supp. 1990).
85. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
86. M. NnMo R, supra note 29, § 8.21[C], at 8-260; Kwall, supra note 29, at 41; see
also Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21; supra note 73 (describing implications of Gilliam holding).
87. Kwall, supra note 29, at 39-56; Singer, supra note 49, at 297; M. ND&MER, supra
note 29, § 8.21[C], at 8-258.
88. Title 17 U.S.C. Section 101 (Supp. 1990) defines a derivative work as a "work based
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, con-
densation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1990). A derivative version of an original work of performance art could
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would be infringing on the author's right to perform derivative versions of
his workY° Second, significant mutilations to the author's work, not rising
to the level of a derivative version, might be prohibited by Gilliam as
exceeding the scope of the performance license.9 1 Finally, where an author
has granted a license to perform a derivative version of his work, modifi-
cations beyond those necessary. to make a derivative version, pursuant to
Gilliam, could constitute a violation of the author's right to prevent muti-
lation to his work.9
While these theories of copyright infringement appear to be powerful
analogues for moral rights, in practice their protections are problematic.93
Most notably, the weak economic position of many performance art authors
may force them to sell their copyrights.Y Obviously, without the copyright
to their work, authors will not have access to the protections of the copyright
laws.95 In addition to assigning their copyrights, performance art authors
include a revival or restaging of a choreographic work made to accommodate modem dancers
or modem dance styles. Singer, supra note 49, at 305.
89. Singer, supra note 49, at 305; Comment, The United States Joins the Berne Con-
vention: New Obligations for Authors' Moral Righ(s?, 68 N.C.L. REv. 363, 379 (1990).
90. Kwall, supra note 29, at 40.
91. M. NimMER, supra note 29, § 8.21[C], at 8-258; Kwall, supra note 29, at 41; see
also Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976) (defendant's
extensive editing constituted copyright infringement); supra note 73 (discussing commentator's
interpretations of Gilliam).
92. Kwall, supra note 29, 40-47; see also Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 23 (while licensees can
edit to slight extent to arrange for presentation of licensor's work, licensee's extensive editing
constituted copyright infringement); supra note 73 (discussing commentator's interpretations
of Gilliam).
93. See infra notes 94-119 and accompanying text (explaining why copyright protections
for copyright are problematic).
94. See Practical Perspectives, supra note 13, at 43 (recognizing economic pressures
under which authors work).
95. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 47 (questioning whether playwright would have protec-
tions of copyright law if he sold his copyright). This statement must be qualified by the
proviso that if a performance art author sells his copyright in return for a share of the royalties
that the work generates, the author still may be able to avail himself of the protection of the
copyright laws. Id. at 49. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), the beneficial owner of a copyright
can institute an action for any infringement of the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (Supp. 1990).
Commentators and some courts have taken the view that the members of Cofigress intended
beneficial owners to encompass authors who, while no longer owning their copyrights, receive
royalties for their works. Kwall, supra note 29, at 49; see also, e.g., Cortner v. Israel, 732
F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1984) (authors of musical work who assigned copyrights in work in exchange
for payment of royalties may sue for infringement of their beneficial interest in their copyrights);
Kamakasi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding
that singer Barry Manilow's transfer of certain copyrights in his songs to music corporation
in exchange for royalty payments did not preclude action for copyright infringement, given
Manilow's status as beneficial owner of copyright).
The principle difficulty with the beneficial owner argument is that if the author transfers
his copyright for a one-time fee, rather than a percentage of the royalties, the author might
not qualify as a beneficial owner. See Cortner, 732 F.2d at 271 (holding that when author
assigns copyright title to publisher in exchange for payment of royalties, equitable trust
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may also forgo the protections of the copyright laws by failing to register
their works, a common event in some areas of the performance arts.9 In
part these performance art authors fail to register because they are skeptical
about the usefulness of copyright registration.97 The United States has
conceived and formulated its copyright law primarily to protect a creator's
economic interests in his intellectual property.9 Where intellectual property
has little economic potential, as does most performance art,99 its authors
have little motivation to seek out copyright protection for their property.2°
Another reason why performance art authors have not sought copyright
protection for their works hinges on copyright law's historical biases against
certain types of performance art.'0' Congress' slow recognition of chore-
ography as an independent art form, one that could be registered under the
federal copyright laws, illustrates this bias.102 Congress did not consider
dance an independent art form, copyrightable under federal law, until 1976
when Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act.103 Prior to 1976 federal
copyright law treated dance as a subspecies of drama.'0 This inaccurate
classification prevented choreographers from registering their works unless
their choreography depicted some story or emotion. 0 5 Because much dance
lacks such elements,"'6 many choreographers could not register their works.
°7
relationship is established between two parties, giving author standing to sue for copyright
infringement); Kamakasi Music, 534 F. Supp. at 74 (stating that where author transfers legal
title to the copyright in exchange for royalties based on sales, author is beneficial owner).
Thus, the author would not have the protections of the copyright laws. See Cortner, 732 F.2d
at 271 (same); Kamakasi Music, 534 F. Supp. at 74 (same). One commentator has suggested
that authors "presumably would not transfer their copyrights absent some type of royalty
arrangement." Kwall, supra note 29, at 49. However, in view of the weak bargaining position
that most performance art authors have versus performance art entrepreneurs, one might
question the validity of this presumption. See Singer, supra note 49, at 296 (stating that
performance art authors may not possess bargaining power to insure sufficient contractual
protections). While courts might expand the meaning of beneficial interest to encompass all
performance art authors who have transferred their copyrights, no court presently has so
ruled. Kwall, supra note 29, at 49.
96. Singer, supra note 49, at 299.
97. Id. at 297.
98. Kwall, supra note 29, at 2; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (noting
that economic philosophy behind copyright clause is belief that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is best way to advance public welfare).
99. See C. GRODIN, supra note 62, at 183-84 (describing screenwriters' and playwrights'
difficulties in trying to get their screenplays and scripts produced).
100. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 2 (stating that copyright laws protect author's pecuniary
interests); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 219 (noting that economic philosophy behind copyright
clause is belief that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is best way to advance
public welfare).
101. Singer, supra note 49, at 299.
102. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties that dance
has faced in becoming copyrightable).
103. Singer, supra note 49, at 288.
104. Id. at 288, 298.
105. Id. at 298.
106. See id. at 298 (noting that dance has been defined as art form that "embodies 'an
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Though choreography eventually was afforded its own distinct niche within
the federal copyright laws,108 choreographers, particularly those outside the
mainstream, remain suspicious of current law and have been reluctant to
register their works.' °9
Regardless of whether an artist has registered and retained his copyright,
the use of copyright laws to protect the personality interests in a work may
be difficult. Similar to the inadequacies of contractual moral rights ana-
logues, copyright is a clumsy legal mechanism for redressing the multitude
of personality rights violations that a performance art author can suffer." 0
For instance, as previously mentioned, where the performance art author
grants a performance license for his work, and the interpretive artist
performs such a modified version as to constitute a derivative work, the
author may be able to sue for copyright infringement under title 17 of
United States Code section 106(2)."' However, to constitute a derivative
work under section 106(2), the interpretive artist might have to make gross
modifications to the author's work, modifications that rise to the level of
an adaptation rather than a distortion or mutilation of the author's work." 2
Because most changes to an author's work will be isolated deviations, not
rising to the level of an adaptation, many actions brought pursuant to
section 106(2) will not redress severe violations to the author's personality
rights.
13
Those personality right violations that fall through the cracks of section
106 might be caught by a suit brought pursuant to Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Co., Inc., a case that commentators have suggested stands for
the proposition that artists have a right to prevent mutilations to their work,
whether or not the mutilations rise to the level of a derivative work."14
However, Gilliam is too indiscriminate a tool to redress personality right
violations." 5 First, in the fifteen years since the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit issued the Gilliam opinion, no other court
ever has used Gilliam to redress personality rights violations." 6 Second, the
arrangement in time-space, using human bodies as its units of design') (quoting B. VARNER,
STUDY No. 28, CoPYiorrT ur CtolzocRA.pmc WorKs 110 (1959) (letter from Agnes de Mille)).
107. Singer, supra note 49, at 298.
108. Id. at 299.
109. Id.
110. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text (describing inadequacies of copyright
law as analogue for moral rights).
111. Singer, supra note 49, at 305.
112. See Comment, supra note 89, at 379 (stating that § 106(2) may only cover adaptations
of work and not distortions or mutilations to work).
113. Id.
114. M. NmIER, supra note 29, § 8.21[C], at 8-260-61; Kwall, supra note 29, at 21; see
also Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that
unauthorized editing of author's work can constitute infringement of copyright); supra note
73 (discussing commentator's interpretations of Gilliam).
115. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (discussing why Gilliam cannot redress
personality rights violations).
116. But see WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622,
625 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Gilliam on other grounds).
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copyright portion of the Gilliam opinion simply may be a contract case, in
which the plaintiff's victory hinged solely on its explicit reservation of the
right to approve all subsequent edits." 7 Finally, even if Gilliam does stand
for the proposition that an author has an absolute right to prevent muti-
lations to his work, the facts of Gilliam may limit the meaning of "muti-
lation" to the kind of gross editing that the defendant in Gilliam performed
on the plaintiff's work."" Obviously, such a conception of mutilation does
not begin to encompass the multitude of personality rights violations that
an interpretive artist can inflict on the work's author." 9
Besides copyright and contract, potentially the most significant American
moral rights analogue for performance art authors is embodied in unfair
competition under state common law 20 and particularly section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.' 2' These two doctrines originally were conceived as a means
to prevent false advertising in the sale of goods or services.' 22 However,
commentators and a number of court opinions have suggested that unfair
117. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 22 (holding that because licensor's agreement explicitly
retains all rights not granted by contract, omission of any terms concerning alterations in
program after recording must be read as reserving to licensor's exclusive authority for such
revisions); see also supra note 74 (discussing commentator's various interpretations of Gilliam).
118. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21 (noting that approximately 24 minutes of 90 minute
broadcast was edited out).
119. See supra -notes 2-14 and accompanying text (describing various violations of per-
formance art author's moral rights).
120. See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that it is unfair
competition for purchaser of master discs to produce and sell abbreviated record if purchaser
attributed music to plaintiff); Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 206, 341 N.E.2d
817, 820, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390, 395 (1975) (holding that essence of unfair competition claim is
that defendant assembled product that bears striking resemblance to plaintiff's such that public
will be confused as to identity of products).
121. The Lanham Act states:
(a) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading descrip-
tion of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such.person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, char-
acteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
§ 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1989).
122. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that section 43(a) of Lanham Act is federal counterpart to state unfair competition
law); Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition at the End of the First Decade of the Lanham
Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1029, 1039 (1957) (stating that primary purpose
of section 43(a) is to provide a private remedy in cases of false advertising); Note, supra note
28, at 481 (stating that Lanham Act was meant to combat problems associated with false
advertising in sale of goods or services related to trademarks).
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competition and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act could encompass an
author's rights of paternity and integrity.-'
Simply put, a successful cause of action for unfair competition brought
under the common-law or under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act requires
the plaintiff to demonstrate that "a representation of a product, although
technically true, creates a false impression of the product's origin,"1' 4 and
that the representation harms the plaintiff's reputation.-5 Theoretically, a
production of a performance art author's work could so significantly diverge
from the author's intent, that the production could be termed as not being
the author's work.- 5 To avoid criticism or prevent the production from
diverging from the author's work, the author could bring either a common-
law unfair competition claim or a federal Lanham Act action, claiming that
crediting authorship of the work to the author constitutes a false impression
of the work's origins. 27
Despite the apparent suitability of unfair competition as a moral rights
analogue, the doctrine in both its state and federal forms inadequately
protects the personality interests of performance art authors.- 8 As in the
case of contract and copyright, unfair competition primarily focuses on
protecting the author's economic interests by protecting the author's personal
123. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 604-07 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding implicitly that
if author's name is eliminated from his work, author has claim under § 43(a) that parallels
paternity right); Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25 (holding that edited version broadcast by defendant
probably violated Lanham Act in that it impaired integrity of plaintiff's work); Note, supra
note 47, at 218 (noting that "false designation of origin" language can protect author's
paternity right, while possibility of misleading public through false description can be used to
protect author's integrity right); Note, supra note 48, at 169-70 (stating that artists successfully
have convinced courts to use unfair competition to protect paternity and integrity rights).
In 1976, the Second Circuit in Gilliam used the Lanham Act as support for a preliminary
injunction against the American Broadcasting Companies' (ABC) pending broadcast of a
severely edited Monty Python program. 538 F.2d at 25. Monty Python, through its primary
licensee, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), granted ABC a performance license to
broadcast a ninety minute Monty Python program based on one of Monty Python's screenplays.
Id. at 17-18. ABC edited more than twenty four minutes from the ninety minute broadcast
without obtaining the necessary permission of Monty Python. Id. at 21. The Second Circuit
asserted that ABC probably had violated the Lanham Act, stating that "the edited version
broadcast by ABC impaired the integrity of [Monty Python's] work and represented to the
public as the product of [Monty Python] what was actually a mere caricature of their talents."
Id. at 25.
The opinion is notable for both the court's novel use of-the Lanham act to protecr Monty
Python's personality rights and the court's implicit recognition that the Lanham Act could be
used to as a moral rights analogue. Id. at 24-25.
124. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24; see also Shaw v. Time Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 206,
341 N.E.2d 817, 820, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390, 395 (1975) (stating that essence of unfair competition
claim is that defendant assembles product that bears such resemblance to plaintiff's product
that public will be confused as to identity of products).
125. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24; Shaw, 38 N.Y.2d at 207, 341 N.E.2d at 821, 379 N.Y.S.2d
at 396.
126. See supra note 124-25 and accompanying text (discussing cause of action for unfair
competition).
127. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (holding that representation of product, although
technically true, creates false impression of product's origin sufficient to violate Lanham Act).
128. Note, supra note 48, at 177-79.
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and business reputation. 2 9 More specifically, the underlying theory of. unfair
competition is that an individual should not get economic benefit by falsely
presenting his work as that of another. 130 Conversely, a creator should not
have his business or personal reputation harmed by false attributions that
he has authored shoddy work.'
These underlying rationales suggest that a successful state or federal
unfair competition claim depends on the performance art author having
some kind of professional or personal reputation that has economic value
for the author. 32 Most performance art authors have no such reputation.
3 3
Thus, while a production of a performance art author's work may severely
harm the author's personality interests, unfair competition will provide little
recourse for the relatively unknown author.
3 4
In addition to unfair competition's basic incompatibility with the per-
sonality interests of performance art authors, the doctrine's ability to protect
performance art author's moral rights often is limited by the author's
contractual arrangements with the producer of the author's work. 3 5 If the
author expressly or implicitly has contracted away a personality right at-
tached to his work-the right to forestall editing, for instance-then the
artist cannot bring an unfair competition action that arises out of the
licensee's valid exercise of that waived right. 36 Because of the disparate
bargaining power between performance art authors and performance art
129. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (noting that Lanham Act invoked to prevent misrepre-
sentations that may injure plaintiff's business or personal reputation); Comment, supra note
89, at 375 (noting that Lanham Act invoked to prevent misrepresentation that may injure
plaintiff's business or personal reputation).
130. Comment, supra note 89, at 375; see also Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th
Cir. 1981) (recognizing that substituting author's name with that of another "is wrongful
because it involves an attempt to misappropriate or profit from another's talents and work-
manship").
131. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (recognizing that Lanham Act "has been invoked to
prevent misrepresentations that may injure plaintiff's business or personal reputation"); Shaw
v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 207, 341 N.E.2d 817, 821, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390, 396 (1975)
(noting that unfair competition protects plaintiff's reputation).
132. Comment, supra note 89, at 375; see also Shaw, 38 N.Y.2d at 207, 341 N.E.2d at
821, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 396 (recognizing that damage to one's reputation only occurs where
inferior work successfully has been palmed off to public as product of another whose goods
public has favorably received).
133. Comment, sup ra note 89, at 375.
134. See id. (noting that many artists have no professional reputation).
135. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring) (stating that Lanham Act is
not implicated where licensee may, by contract, distort author's work); Vargas v. Esquire,
Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526-27 (7th Cir. 1947) (holding that plaintiff cannot bring unfair competition
claim where plaintiff has contracted away all his rights in property at issue); see also Note,
supra note 48, at 178 (noting that author cannot rely on § 43(a) of Lanham Act to protect
personality interests if author has contracted away his right to alter his work).
136. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring) (reasoning that if license grants
interpretive artist right to distort work, Lanham Act does not come into play); Vargas, 164
F.2d at 526-27 (concluding that it is difficult to discern claim for unfair competition where
plaintiff gave defendant rights to work via contract).
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entrepreneurs, 3 7 the interdependence of unfair competition and contracting
especially is detrimental to the doctrine's usefulness for the performance art
author."
In addition to the difficulties afflicting the general unfair competition
doctrine, the federal form of unfair competition, section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, has several unique limitations of its own that limit the doctrines
usefulness as a moral rights analogue. 3 9 First, no court, including the
Gilliam court, explicitly has held that the Lanham Act encompasses an
author's integrity or paternity rights. 40 Second, a producer of a performance
art author's work may be able to cure a Lanham Act violation simply by
not attributing the author's work to the author. 4' Such a tactic would avoid
the misdescription that is basis of a Lanham Act violation. 42 For example,
if the defendant in Gilliam had broadcast the Monty Python special without
attributing the.special to the plaintiff, the defendant might have circum-
vented Lanham Act liability. 4 Third, to use the Lanham Act as a surrogate
for an author's integrity right, an author must demonstrate a significant
distortion to his work.'" The existing case law is unclear as to what
constitutes such a significant distortion. 4
The members of Congress engaged in wishful thinking when they pointed
performance art authors to existing American law for moral rights protec-
tion. 1 Every one of the moral rights "analogues" noted previously has
two limitations that forestall performance art authors from using these
137. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 27 (stating that unknown authors face disparity of
bargaining power that frequently results in loss of protections); Practical Perspectives, supra
note 13, at 43 (stating that economic pressures often force playwrights to freely consent to
changes to their works).
138. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between unfair
competition and contracting).
139. See "infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (discussing specific hindrances on
performance art author's use of § 43(a) of Lanham Act to protect author's personality
interests).
140. Note, supra note 48, at 179.
141. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of The
Moral Rights of Authors, 22 ImTmn. PRop. L. Rnv. 547, 608 (1990); Note, supra note 48, at
178-79.
142. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 14, 27 (2d Cir. 1976) (Gurfein, J., concurring) (attributing
purpose of Lanham act to redressing misdescription of origins).
143. Note, supra note 48, at 179.
144. Id. at 178-79.
145. Id. at 179. In Gilliam the defendant unlawfully removed over twenty four minutes
from a ninety minute program based on the plaintiff's script. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 18. In
response, plaintiff brought a successful § 43(a) action under the Lanham Act. Id. at 23-24. If
a significant distortion must approach the severity of removing over 25% of the author's work
from a particular performance, the Lanham Act will be of little use for performance art
authors. Interpretive distortions in the performing arts can be very significant, but few
distortions to the author's work will rise to the level of the distortions in Gilliam. See supra
notes 2-9 and accompanying text (describing Boston ART incident).
146. See Final Report, supra note 45, at 555 (stating that United States provides moral
rights analogues sufficient to comply with paternity and integrity provisions of Berne).
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analogues to protect the personality interests contained in their works. 47
The most fundamental of the two is that moral rights analogues are designed
to redress economic rather than personal injuries.14' As a result, these
analogues only redress the most extreme forms of personality injury-
injuries that result in economic harm to the artist. 49 The vast majority of
personality injuries do not rise to the level of economic injury and, thus,
escape recognition under so called moral rights analogues. 50
The second fundamental flaw of the moral rights analogues is that their
availability hinges on the amount of bargaining power the performance art
author possesses when dealing with the producers and interpreters of his
work.'5' Because the supply of performance art far outstrips its demand," 2
performance art authors typically lack the requisite bargaining power to
secure the protections of these moral rights analogues. 53 In view of these
two limitations on moral rights analogues, effective recognition of moral
rights for performance art authors only can come from cohesive federal
legislation. 54
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISStiES SURROUNDING PERFORMANCE ART AUTHOR
MORAL RIGHTS
Any federal moral rights legislation must contend with two provisions
of the United States Constitution: the copyright clause and the First Amend-
ment.' 5 Of the two, the copyright clause is the least problematic.' 56 The
United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall have the power
... [tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
Limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries."'' 57 The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted this language to mandate that any statute Congress enacts
147. See supra notes 35-145 and accompanying text (discussing two basic flaws afflicting
America's moral rights analogues).
148. See supra notes 76-78, 97-100 & 129-34 and accompanying text (describing how
contract, copyright and unfair competition law all protect economic rather than personality
injuries).
149. See id. (same).
150. See id. (same).
151. See supra notes 60-66, 94-95 & 135-38 and accompanying text (describing how
performance art author's lack of bargaining power hinders sufficiency of United States moral
rights analogues).
152. See C. GaoDN, supra note 62, at 183-84 (describing author's difficulties in trying
to produce his play scripts and screenplays).
153. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 27.
154. See supra notes 45-153 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of American
moral rights analogues).
155. See infra notes 156-363 and accompanying text (discussing copyright clause and First
Amendment's effect on federal recognition of performance art author moral rights).
156. See infra notes 157-181 and accompanying text (discussing copyright clauses' effect
on federal recognition of performance art author moral rights).
157. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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pursuant to the copyright clause must have the end of promoting the useful
arts. '5 The copyright clause is unique among the Article I powers because
it explicitly specifies the means that Congress may use to reach the end of
promoting the useful arts. 5 9 That is, Congress must promote the useful arts
and sciences by granting "Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive" creations.16° In the past the Court has limited the meaning of this
language to giving artists economic monopolies in their works, in other
words, copyrights.' 6 1 Because moral rights, particularly integrity rights,
embody the author's personality interests rather than the author's economic
interests, congressional enactment of a moral rights statute for performance
art authors could conflict with the Court's reading of the copyright clause's
specified means.162
The apparent conflict between a performance art author's moral rights
and the copyright clause's specified means is illusory in nature, however.
63
While in the past the Court has interpreted the word "Right" to denote
economic right, the Court's interpretation only may reflect the fact that,
until recently,1ss the only rights Congress has attempted to confer on artists
have been economic rights. 65 In any case, the copyright clause itself does
not delineate what the term "Right" encompasses.ss Thus, pursuant to the
necessary and proper clause of the Constitution, 67 Congress could expand
158. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 44 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). The Court
stated in Sony:
The Monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is
a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired.
Id.
159. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (calling for promoting progress of useful arts by
securing exclusive rights for limited times to authors).
160. Id.; see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (noting that Copyright
Clause describes both objective that Congress may seek to promote useful arts and means to
achieve objective by granting authors exclusive right to fruits of respective works).
161. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (recognizing that economic philosophy
behind copyright clause is conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain
is best way to advance public welfare through talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts').
162. See Davis, supra note 28, at 321-22 (cautioning that if moral rights only promote
author's interest, Congress may not enact such rights).
163. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text (analyzing conflict between performance
art author's moral rights and Copyright Clause).
164. See JIA, supra note 39 (according visual artists moral rights).
165. See id. (providing first federal recognition of visual artist's moral rights).
166. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (permitting Congress to confer upon authors "the
exclusive Right to their" creations).
167. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (providing that Congress has power to make all
laws necessary and proper to carry into execution all other powers that Constitution vests in
Congress).
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the term "Right" to encompass the personality interests of performance art
authors, provided the expanded definition of "Right" furthered the copy-
right clause's end of promoting the useful arts.?6s Because moral rights
protection for performance art authors would afford a security to perform-
ance art authors that would encourage creative activity, expanding the term
"Right" to encompass such protections would promote the useful arts.1 69
The duration of a moral right for performance art authors presents a
much more serious constitutional problem than whether noneconomic rights
are constitutional means to promote the useful arts. 170 Unlike the term
"Right," there is no latitude in the copyright clause's directive that Congress
only confer exclusive rights on artists for "Limited Times.' 7' In examining
this problem, one can make a useful comparison between moral rights and
copyright. 72 Courts and commentators uniformly have stated that the Con-
stitution does not permit copyrights with perpetual durations. 7  The ration-
ale behind this constitutional limitation is as follows: because human beings
typically concern themselves only with their own economic well-being and
the economic security of their issue born during their lifetime or soon
thereafter, perpetual economic monopolies do not promote the useful arts
much more than durationally limited economic monopolies do. 174 Further,
after a certain period of time, perpetual economic monopolies only create
unnecessary impositions on the First Amendment.'
7
168. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th
Cir. 1979) (holding that Congress does not exceed its powers when its means to constitutional
end are 'appropriate' and 'plainly adapted' to achieving that end) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
169. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 70; Lambelet, Internationalizing the Copyright Code:
An analysis of Legislative Proposals Seeking Adherence to the Berne Convention, 21 INTELL.
PROP. L. Rnv. 447, 456 (1989).
170. See infra notes 171-81 and accompanying text (discussing durational limitations that
copyright clause places on performance art author's moral rights).
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
172. See infra notes 173-81 and accompanying text (comparing copyright and moral
rights).
173. See Sony, 417 U.S. at 429; see also Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rv. 1180, 1193 (1970)
(considering copyright in perpetuity).
174. See Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1193 (stating that "[i]t seems most unlikely that an
author, assured of the economic fruits of his labor for his own lifetime, that of his children,
and perhaps also his grandchildren, would elect not to engage in creative efforts because his
posterity in perpetuity would not also so benefit").
175. Id. Professor Nimmer has suggested that the inherent conflict between the First
Amendment and copyright becomes untenable when copyrights are extended beyond the lives
of an author's grandchildren. Id. To some extent copyright always abridges the First Amend-
ment interest in freedom of expression. Id. at 1181. But copyright extended through the lives
of the author's grandchildren has a motivational effect on the author that outweighs the
impingement on freedom of expression. Id. at 1193. But copyright extended beyond the lives
of the author's grandchildren only slightly increases the creative motivation of the author while
it continues to abridge the First Amendment interest in free expression. Id. Thus, perpetual
copyright impermissibly abridges the First Amendment.
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Similar to perpetual copyright, perpetual moral rights arguably would
not encourage any more creative activity than moral rights of a linfited
duration.176 An author's desire to control his creation, like many other
personality interests,1" ends with the author's demise. 17  Further, moral
rights for performance art authors, like copyright, might conflict with the
First Amendment.1 79 As in copyright, the First Amendment interest in
expression and the free flow of ideas eventually might outweigh the interests
that a moral right promotes: Promotion of the useful arts and the protection
of an author's personality interest.s 0 For these reasons, a perpetual moral
right would be unconstitutional."1
The First Amendment presents the most serious challenge to any federal
statute extending moral rights protection to the performance art authors. 182
Commentators consistently have suggested that a recognition of performance
art author moral rights, particularly performance art author integrity rights,
would abridge the First Amendment rights of the interpretive artists who
perform the works of performance art authors.s 3 Whether or not these
commentators ultimately are correct, because of performance art's unique
collaborative aspects, affording moral rights protection to performance art
176. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (discussing perpetual moral rights and
its imposition on First Amendment).
177. Cf. W. PROSSER & W. KrnTON, PROSSER AND KEETON om THE LAW OF TORTS 54-66
(5th ed. 1984) (discussing intentional infliction of emotional distress as injury redressable only
when victim is alive).
178. One could contest this assertion, however. In many ways the artist's rights of
paternity and integrity satisfy a need analogous to the human desire for immortality, a
powerful, motivating force in humans. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 38 (stating that public
has interest in protecting its cultural heritage through preservation of artifacts of its civilization).
Perpetual moral rights offer the promise of immortality in the form of a durationally unlimited
right of attribution of authorship and the guarantee of the survival of an artist's "self" as
expressed in his art. See id. at 38 (same). Such a promise could do much to promote the
useful arts. See id. at 38 (stating that purpose of moral rights in part is to promote creation
of artistic works).
179. See Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1193-1200 (explaining how perpetual rights for
author's will conflict with First Amendment).
180. See id. (same).
181. See id. (same).
182. See infra notes 185-417 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment diffi-
culties that performance art author moral rights protection raises).
183. See Note, supra note 48, at 207-08 (stating that First Amendment problems are
threatened when granting moral rights to performance art authors); Tribe, First Amendment
Endgame, Boston Globe, Dec. 15, 1984, at 19, col. 4 (stating that First Amendment should
fully apply to protect producer's right to perform modem stage version of Beckett's Endgame);
see also U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 427 at 366 (1985-86) (citing statement of Edward A. Merlis, Vice-President Government
Relations, National Cable Television Ass'n) (stating that American commitment to balance
public's interest in access to creative works against private interest of authors may create
situation of friction with some of Berne Convention's concepts).
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authors raises more First Amendment concerns than moral rights recognition
in any other artistic context.' 84
For instance, in comparing performance art to visual art, the creator
of a work of visual art originates and realizes the work by f'ing it in a
permanent, finished form."8 5 From that point forward, the only interaction
with the visual artist's work typically will involve passive spectator obser-
vation, observation entailing very little communicative activity.' In contrast,
once an author has created a work of performance art, typically individuals
other than the author will have to contribute effort involving communicative
activity to fully realize the author's work. 87 For example, while the composer
of a symphonic work creates a self-contained piece of art in the form of
finished sheet music, a conductor and many different musicians must
perform the author's work to fully realize it."' Thus, because of performance
art's collaborative aspects, performance art affords many more opportunities
for communicative activity than does visual art. 89 As a result, Congress
implicates the First Amendment if it attempts to control this communicative
activity through statutory recognition of the moral rights of performance
art authors.190
For the purposes of simplicity, this article will discuss the First Amend-
ment concerns that performance art author moral rights implicate in what
is, admittedly, an artificial, two step approach. First, this article will discuss
the First Amendment issues surrounding federal recognition of the perform-
ance art author's basic moral right, independent of the remedies used to
184. See infra notes 185-417 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment concerns
implicated by recognition of visual artist moral rights).
185. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 40-41 (describing examples of visual art).
186. See id. at 40 (defining visual art in terms of physical works of art that are collected
and passively observed); but see id. at 41 (describing incidents where an individual, other than
the author, intentionally modifies author's work).
187. See J. Mn.am, note I, at 33 (stating that play can only be completed when someone
other than playwright has supplied work).
188. See id. (same).
189. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 43 (stating that performance of author's work of
performance art involves other creators who will add their own interpretations). Note, however,
that even visual artists' moral rights protection could raise First Amendment questions where
an individual other than the artist wrongfully modifies the artist's work in some expressive
manner. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (stating that where speech
and nonspeech elements are combined in same course of conduct, only sufficiently important
government interest in regulating nonspeech element can justify limitations on First Amendment
freedoms). In the event of such an alteration, the visual artist could have a cause of action
under the moral rights provisions of the Justice Improvement Act of 1990. See JIA, supra
note 39 (according visual artist integrity rights). However, such a cause of action might
constitute state abridgement of the defendant's First Amendment freedoms. See O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 376 (requiring sufficiently important government interest in regulating nonspeech
element to justify limitations on First Amendment freedoms).
190. See Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes': A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. Rv., 549, 533 & 559 (1962) (stating that First Amendment prohibition against any
law abridging freedom of speech means any law).
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enforce it. 191 Second, the article will discuss the First Amendment issues
surrounding the various moral rights remedies.
19
Any analysis of the First Amendment issues surrounding federal rec-
ognition of a performance art author's basic moral right must begin with
the concession that such legislation, particularly its integrity right compo-
nent, would abridge the range of expression that interpretive artists could
exercise when performing an author's work. 193 When an interpretive artist
performs an author's work in such a manner as to diverge from the author's
text or fails to give correct attribution to the author, to some extent the
interpretive artist is engaging in communicative activities.' 94 Federal legis-
lation that punishes interpretive artists for such communicative acts would
appear to fly directly in the face of the First Amendment's command:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."' 95
However, the courts never have held that every law abridging an
individual's expressive conduct violates the First Amendment.'19 Instead, the
courts have engaged in what Professor Nimmer has called "definitional
balancing" to determine whether the First Amendment's protection encom-
passes a particular type of speech.'9 Specifically, the courts have created
definitions that: (1) demarcate protected speech from unprotected speech;
and (2) embody a balance between the non-First Amendment interests
underlying the demarcation and the First Amendment interests underlying
the demarcation. 98 When performing this balancing act, the courts consider,
191. See infra notes 192-263 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment issues
surrounding federal recognition of performance art author's basic moral right).
192. See infra notes 264-384 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment issues
that moral rights remedies raise).
193. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (discussing how moral rights legislation
abridges expression).
194. See Amarnik, supra note 22, at 43 (stating that performance of author's work of
performance art involves other creators who add their own interpretations); see also Nimmer,
supra note 173, at 1181 (asserting that copyright punishes unauthorized expression).
195. U.S. CoNsT. amend I.
196. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (stating that unconditional
phrasing of First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance); Nimmer, supra
note 173, at 1182-83 (stating that no one believes every law abridging speech falls before First
Amendment). If courts did treat every state abridgement of expression as a First Amendment
violation, then espionage, asititrust, obscenity and nuisance laws would all be unconstitutional.
Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1183-84.
197. See Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1184-90 (discussing definitional balancing); Schauer,
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U.L. Ray. 685,
687 (1978) (discussing definitional balancing approach to First Amendment). Three of the most
famous cases exemplifying definitional balancing are Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1956) (holding that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech"),
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that actual malice is constitutional
element of libel action against public figure) and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, -447
(1969) (stating that state may not prescribe advocacy of use of force except where advocacy
is directed to inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action).
198. Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1184. Justice Brandeis identified the interests underlying
the First Amendment in his famous Whitney v. California concurrence. Whitney v. California,
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according to Nimmer, whether a proposed demarcation effectively serves its
non-First Amendment interests without unduly "encroaching upon the in-
terests" underlying the First Amendment. 19
To withstand a First Amendment challenge, therefore, any federal
legislation according performance art author moral rights would have to
encompass an appropriate definitional balance. 2 In developing such a
definitional balance, one might consider importing copyright law's recog-
nized demarcation between protected and unprotected speech, the "idea/
expression dichotomy."120 1 This demarcation accords First Amendment pro-
tection to ideas?4 Therefore, to avoid abrogating free speech rights, authors
are prevented from copyrighting the ideas used in their creations. 2 3 On the
other hand, the idea/expression dichotomy does not extend First Amendment
protection to the manner in which authors express their ideas. 204 Thus,
authors can copyright their expressions. 205 While questions have arisen as
to what differentiates idea from expression,"6 most commentators and courts
274 U.S. 357, 374-75 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). These interests include: (1) furthering
the democratic process; (2) providing a safety valve for societal discord; and (3) affording
individuals a means to attain self-fulfillment. Id.; see also Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1187-
89 (discussing copyright and three interests underlying First Amendment).
199. Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1189.
200. See id. at 1184-90 (discussing definitional balancing).
201. Id. at 1189; Goldwag, Copyright Infringement and The First Amendment, 23 Cop-
Ysuo-rr L. Smp. (ASCAP) 1, 7 (1983); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. 1990) (stating that
in no case does copyright protection for original work extend to any idea); Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (stating that "there is a point in this series
of abstractions where [the elements of a play] are no longer protected [by copyright], since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended"), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
202. Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1189-90.
203. Id.; see also Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Journal Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d
91, 95-97 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that news event was idea, and thus not copyrightable), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
204. Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1189-90; see also Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 95-97 (stating
that words used to communicate idea constitute expression that First Amendment does not
protect).
205. Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1189-90.
206. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d at 119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1930)
(stating that wherever line is drawn between idea and expression, determination will appear
arbitrary), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). While admitting the arbitrary nature of the
distinction between idea and expression, Justice Hand in Nichols described a method of
ascertaining the nature of an idea underlying a play:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The
last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is
about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected [by copyright], since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their
expression, his property never extended.
Id. at 121.
Justice Hand was probably correct to call the line between idea and expression arbitrary.
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have considered the dichotomy workable within existing law and an effective
balance between the interests underlying the First Amendment and copy-
right.=0
At first consideration, the idea/expression dichotomy appears aptly
suited to the context of moral rights for performance art authors."' A
performance art author's moral rights only would encompass the author's
expression.2 An author's integrity and paternity rights never would extend
to the theme, message, or idea that a work of performance art attempts to
communicate.2 10 Thus, an interpretive artist, with impunity, could inject new
ideas into the author's work, distort the original ideas contained in the
author's work or refuse to give attribution to the author's original ideas.21,
Despite the facial suitability of the idea/expression dichotomy as a
definitional balance for performance art author moral rights, the idea/
expression dichotomy and performance art moral rights, particularly integ-
rity rights, are incompatible.2 2 This incompatibility stems from the fact
that, particularly within the context of the performing arts, the distinctions
between idea and expression are meaningless. 213 Idea and manifested ex-
pression often are inextricably intertwined in performance art.2 4 In other
See id. at 121-22 (discussing distinction between idea and expression). He appears to consider
a work's "idea" to be something analogous to a work's "theme." See id. (same). However,
one does not have to describe a theme in general terms. Rather one can state a work's theme
with such particularity as to incorporate a great deal of the work's "expression." See Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating
that copying exact expression may be only way precisely to report idea), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 823 (1984). Indeed copyright law, in what is called the merger doctrine, recognizes that
in some cases a work's expressive components inseparably are tied to the ideas underlying a
work. See 3 M. Nnmasm, supra note 29, § 13.03[B][3], at 13-58 to 13-60 (discussing merger
doctrine). However, regardless of the entwined relationship between idea and expression,
copyright law has accepted Justice Hand's over-simplified demarcation. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(Supp. 1990) (providing that copyright protection does not extend to any idea, regardless of
form in which it is embodied in work).
207. See Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1192 (stating that idea/expression line represents
acceptable definitional balance between First Amendment and copyright); Nichols, 45 F.2d at
121 (discussing idea/expression dichotomy).
208. See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text (discussing suitability of idea/expression
dichotomy for performance art authors' moral rights).
209. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (discussing copyright idea/expression dichotomy).
210. See id. (same).
211. See id. (same). Under this view, to extend moral rights to encompass the performance
art author's ideas would forestall further creation of performance art and new ideas, ideas
that our democratic system of government requires. See Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1190-91
(preventing authors from drawing freely on others' ideas stifles creative process and free
speech).
212. See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text (discussing idea/expression dichotomy's
incompatibility with performance art moral rights).
213. See 3 M. N RmR, supra note 29, § 13.03[B][3], at 13-58 to 13-60 (discussing copyright
merger doctrine).
214. See id. (same). Modern dance is one illustration of the intertwined nature of ideas
and expression within the performing arts. See Singer, supra note 49, at 299 n.50 (discussing
nature of modem dance). Modem choreographers often build their works around a single
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words, the elements compromising the expressive component of a work of
performance art-be they words, musical notes, characters, or movement-
define the author's underlying ideas.2 5 Therefore, any modification to the
author's expression, in some subtle manner, will inject new ideas into the
author's work-ideas with First Amendment protection.
21 6
In practice, interpretive artists would attempt to use the intertwined
nature of idea and expression to circumvent liability for violations of an
author's integrity rights.217 Specifically, whenever an interpretive artist dis-
torted an author's work in a manner actionable under moral rights legis-
lation, the interpretive artist would assert that he had engaged in a form
of "idea" creation that the First Amendment protects. 211 Indeed, to secure
the protection of the idea/expression dichotomy, interpretive artists would
ensure that all of their modifications to authors' works reflected new ideas.
219
A definitional balance based on the idea/expression dichotomy, clearly
raises the prospect of interpretive artists using the First Amendment as a
shield against moral rights liability, allowing them to make radical changes
to performance art author's works.22 Therefore, if moral rights recognition
for performance art authors is to have any real meaning, federal legislation
must be based on an alternative definitional balance. A more functional
balance might be developed from the following two assertions: (1) speech
that does not distort another's speech is presumptively a valuable addition
to the marketplace of ideas and thus, should be encouraged; (2) speech that
distorts or silences another's speech harms the marketplace of ideas and,
thus, should be remedied.
A speaker's freedom of speech is meaningless without assurances that
the speaker's speech will remain relatively unchanged as it enters the
marketplace of ideas.' In some contexts, such assurances exist absent any
movement rather than an idea that concerns a character or story. Id. In such an instance, th.e
choreography's idea and expression are merged to the point of inseparability. Id. Idea and
Expression are also inseparable in many musical compositions.
215. See 3 M. NnIMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[B][3], at 13-58 to 13-60 (discussing copyright
merger doctrine); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044,
1049-50 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that copying exact expression may be only way to describe idea
precisely), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
216. See 3 M. NMMER, supra note 29, at 15-58 (stating that where idea is inseparably
connected to particular expression, affording protection to author's expression would confer
monopoly over idea itself in violation of First Amendment).
217. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text (discussing how interpretive artists can
use intertwined nature of idea and expression to circumvent moral rights liability).
218. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text (discussing entwined nature of idea
and expression).
219. Id. (same).
220. See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text (discussing how idea/expression
dichotomy affords performance art authors First Amendment shield against moral rights
liability).
221. Hughes, supra note 15, at 359. Conversely, "[t]he right of free speech of ... any
... individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the speech of others." Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
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legal interference.m For instance, public figures often find that the media
distorts their statements.m However, as the Supreme Court has observed,
public figures typically have access to forums where they can correct these
distortions. 4 However, where nonlegal mechanisms do not exist to ensure
that a speaker's speech remains undistorted, the legal system can take action
to ensure that a speaker's speech reaches the marketplace of ideas in an
undisturbed form. 5 Such activism is supported by the goals underlying the
First Amendment itself, particularly free speech's vital role in the democratic
process.? Uncorrectable distorted speech fills the market place of ideas
with destructive information that confuses participants in the democratic
process. 227 Further, distorted speech interferes with two other goals under-
Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1977) (stating that where speaker imminently threatens to drown
out other points of view, such that democratic process and other First Amendment interests
are threatened, Court will consider whether state action to silence intrusive voice is appropriate).
222. Hughes, supra note 15, at 360.
223. Id.
224. Id. See also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979) (stating
that public figures are less vulnerable to injury from defamatory statements because of ability
to resort to self-help); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (stating that
"public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels
of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy").
225. Hughes, supra note 15, at 359-60. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the United
States Supreme Court upheld such legal assurances. 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1968). In Red Lion
the Court upheld the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC's) "fairness doctrine" in
part because the scarcity of the airwaves prevented many legitimate messages from reaching
the airwaves. Id. at 400; see also First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (citing Red Lion)
(stating that where legislative findings or record demonstrate that one voice is silencing others
to detriment of First Amendment interests, state may take corrective measures). But cf. Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1975) (stating that concept that government may restrict speech
of some elements of our society to enhance relative voices of others is wholly foreign to First
Amendment).
Libel law may be another area in which the Court has created a mechanism to ensure a
speaker's message reaches the market place of ideas. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (holding that
private figure does not have to show malice for prima facie libel case). Specifically, because
private individuals may not have a public figure's potential access to the media, the Court
adjusted the constitutionalized version of libel it created in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1963), to permit private figures to bring successful libel suits without proving
malice. See id. This adjustment to the Court's balance between libel and the First Amendment
only may reflect the Court's solicitude for the private individual's reputational interests. See
id. (stating that private individuals are more vulnerable to reputational injury than public
figures). However, the Court may have been attempting to further First Amendment interests
as well. Allowing private figures easier access to a libel action, as compared to public figures,
may have been the Court's attempt to ensure that the "truth" enters the market place of
ideas. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (false statements of fact have no constitutional value and
neither intentional lie nor careless error materially advance society's interest in uninhibited,
robust, and wide open debate on public issues).
226. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1977) (stating that
First Amendment furthers democratic process); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-75
(1927) (stating that free speech furthers democratic process).
227. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
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lying the First Amendment. Uncorrectable distorted speech reduces the
effectiveness of the First Amendment's social safety-valve effect, 2 and,
because of audience miscomprehension, it thwarts the First Amendment's
facilitation of speaker self-fulfillment. 229
A work of performance art essentially is speech that uses carefully
contrived expression to communicate an elaborate message from the author
to the public.2 0 To ensure that the public accurately receives these messages,
performance art authors, particularly those who have sold their copyrights
or cannot secure strong contractual arrangements, 23 1 need legal mechanisms
to ensure that interpretive artists do not distort their messages or the fragile
means by which authors communicate their message. 232 Federal recognition
of performance art author moral rights would be such a mechanism.
23
3
These observations lead to the following proposed demarcation between
protected and unprotected speech: (1) where an interpretive artist incorpo-
rates speech into a performance of an author's work that is consistent with
the author's message or the author's expression of that message, the First
Amendment protects the interpretive artist's speech and prevents the gov-
ernment from regulating it;23 (2) where the interpretive artist incorporates
speech into a performance of an author's work that modifies the author's
message or expression of that message, the First Amendment does not
protect the interpretive artist's speech, and the government may regulate
it.235 The terms "author's message" or "author's expression" encompass
any statement the author inserts in his work, including any attribution of
authorship to the author. The term "modify" encompasses the interpretive
artist's failure to communicate any message the author has placed in his
work, including statements of authorship. Thus, this demarcation encom-
passes both the performance art author's rights of paternity and integrity.
[For ease of discussion this demarcation will be termed "the corrective view
of moral rights" or "corrective view"].
(stating that best test of truth is power of thought to get itself accepted in competition of
marketplace); Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Dtnca L.J. I
(discussing classic market approach to First Amendment-repression of speech interferes with
market's ability to ascertain truth).
228. See Hughes, supra note 15, at 359-60 (asserting that individual does not achieve any
release through "sounding off" if his communication has not been understood by anyone).
229. See id. (same).
230. See Note, supra note 48, at 207-09 (stating that playwrights produce works that First
Amendment protects).
231. See supra notes 59-81 & 93-119 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties plaguing
contract and copyright analogues to performance art author moral rights).
232. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1977) (stating that
where speaker imminently threatens to drown out other points of view, threatening the
democratic process and other First Amendment interests, courts will consider whether state
action to silence voice is appropriate).
233. See supra notes 220-29 and accompanying text (discussing need for legal mechanisms
to ensure speaker's undistorted message enters marketplace of ideas).
234. See id. (same).
235. See id. (same).
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Having established a tentative demarcation for a basic performance art
author moral right, the next step in a definitional balance analysis is to
consider whether this demarcation advances the interests underlying both
federal moral rights recognition and the First Amendment. 6 The corrective
view advances the copyright clause purpose that must underlie any con-
gressional conference of exclusive rights on authors, promotion of the useful
arts2 37 If performance art authors are assured that their undistorted messages
will reach the public, author are encouraged to create, and, accordingly,
will do so more often.238 In addition, because the corrective view allows
performance art authors to protect the personality interests in their works,
the corrective view furthers the interests underlying moral rights recognition
for performance art authors.2 9
Whether the corrective view of moral rights encroaches on the interests
underlying the First Amendment is a slightly more complicated question
that may turn in part on whose First Amendment interests one is considering.
Clearly, the corrective view of moral rights promotes the author's and the
public's First Amendment interests in ensuring that the author's message
reaches the public in the author's intended form.m However, the corrective
view of moral rights hampers the interpretive artist's ability to modify the
performance art author's message.24Y As has been suggested previously, this
hampering may curtail the interpretive artist's freedom of expression. 2A"
However, as also was suggested previously, expression that distorts or
silences another's message harms the marketplace of ideas243 and thus, should
be subject to legal regulation. 2" Therefore, the corrective view of moral
rights does not encroach upon the First Amendment simply because it
236. Nimmer, supra note 173, at 1189.
237. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (providing that Congress must promote useful
arts by granting authors exclusive rights to their creations).
238. KwalI, supra note 29, at 70 ; Lambelet, supra note 169, at 478.
239. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 37 (describing author's manifestation of his per-
sonality into his art).
240. Hughes, supra note 15, at 359; see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435
U.S. 765, 789-90 (1977) (stating where speaker imminently threatens to drown out other points
of view, threatening the democratic process and other First Amendment interests, courts will
consider whether state action to silence intrusive voice is appropriate); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 & 400 (1968) (stating that where legislative findings or record
demonstrate that one voice is silencing others to detriment of First Amendment interests, state
may take corrective measures).
241. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (discussing how performance art
author moral rights legislation abridges interpretive artist's ability to modify author's expres-
sion).
242. See id. (discussing how performance art moral rights curtail interpretive artist
expression).
243. See First Nat'l Bank, 438 U.S. at 789-90 (stating that where speaker imminently
threatens to drown out other points of view, such that democratic process and other First
Amendment interests are threatened, courts will consider whether state action to silence voice
is appropriate).
244. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (providing that right of free speech of any individual
does not encompass right to snuff out speech of others).
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abridges an interpretive artist's ability to modify an author's message. 24
While the corrective view of moral rights does not directly encroach on
the interests underlying the First Amendment, the corrective view nonetheless
may implicate the interpretive artist's First Amendment interests in a more
indirect fashion. Specifically, the corrective view of moral rights might
inhibit interpretive artists from ever exercising their First Amendment rightsm
(i.e., the right to incorporate speech into a performance of an author's
work that is not inconsistent with the author's message or the author's
expression of that message).2 7 In other words, the corrective view might
chill interpretive artists from exercising their First Amendment rights. 
2
Determining whether the corrective view of moral rights impermissibly
could chill interpretive artists from exercising their First Amendment rights
turns in part on the probability of the courts erroneously holding interpretive
artist's liable for violations of authors' moral rights.249 The clarity and the
simplicity of the corrective view's demarcation between protected and un-
protected speech directly will affect this probability.20 If the demarcation
245. Additional support for this proposition can be found by analogy Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The Lloyd Court rejected respondent's claim that since a shopping
center was open to the public, the First Amendment prevented the private owner from enforcing
a handbilling restriction on the shopping center premises. Id. at 568-69; see also Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1979) (discussing Lloyd and its holding). The
Lloyd Court held that when a shopping center owner opens his private property to the public
for shopping, the First Amendment does not accord individuals handbilling on the premises
rights of expression beyond those existing under applicable state law. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 568-
69; Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81.
While a performance art author's interests are not the equivalent of a shopping center
owner's property rights, they are sufficiently analogous to allow a performance art author to
assert that although the "public" (as embodied in interpretive artists and audiences) has access
to the author's work, the "public" does not have a First Amendment right of expression that
supersedes the author's personality interests in his work. See Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569 (holding
that where individual opens his private property to public, First Amendment does not accord
public rights of expression exercisable upon individual's property).
246. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 685 (stating that unconstitutional statute might
inhibit exercise of First Amendment freedoms).
247. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text (describing corrective view's demar-
cation between protected and unprotected speech).
248. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1963) (stating that an
unconstitutional law can force possessor of First Amendment rights to forego exercising his
rights for fear that court incorrectly will find that possessor violated law); see also Schauer,
supra note 197, at 693 (defining First Amendment chilling effect as where "individuals seeking
to engage in activity protected by the first amendment are deterred from so doing by
governmental regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity").
249. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 694-96 (stating that one component of fear causing
First Amendment chill is probability of courts erroneously imposing legal liability). The extent
of First Amendment chill also increases in direct relation to the magnitude of the harm
resulting from erroneous court determinations of liability. Id. at 696. However, discussion of
this component of First Amendment chill will await this article's examination of the First
Amendment issues surrounding the various moral rights remedies. See supra notes 266-34 and
accompanying text (discussing First Amendment chill generated by moral rights remedies).
250. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 695-96 (suggesting that fear of erroneous court
determinations increases and decreases in direct relation to complexity and vagueness of legal
concepts that demarcate protected speech from unprotected speech).
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is unduly complex or vague, there will be a corresponding rise in the risk
of erroneous court decisions that will punish interpretive artist for exercising
their protected rights of free speech.25' Because interpretive artists are less
likely to assert their free speech rights; if they face significant risk of
unwarranted liability, a rise in the probabilities of erroneous court deter-
minations translates into increased First Amendment chill.2 2 However, if
the corrective view's demarcation between protected and unprotected speech
is fairly clear and analytically simple, the risk of erroneous court determi-
nations will drop, along with interpretive artist's fear of erroneous court
determinations. 2s3 Thus, the corrective view would be less likely to chill
interpretive artists from engaging in the expressive conduct that the First
Amendment protects. 2s4
Because the corrective view of performance art author moral rights
constitutes a simple and fairly clear demarcation between protected and
unprotected speech, federal legislation using the corrective view would not
create significant First Amendment chill.255 The corrective view of moral
rights conditions an interpretive artist's liability on whether or not the
interpretive artist's expressive conduct modifies speech that the author placed
in his work of performance art.256 If federal legislation limited the "author's
speech" to the explicit expression contained in the author's actual work of
performance art (including the author's statement of authorship), determin-
ing moral rights liability would be a fairly straightforward task for the
courts. 257 Essentially, the courts would compare the alleged modification
with the pertinent portions of the author's work of performance art.258
251. See id.; cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278-79 (stating that demarcating
protected speech from libelous speech solely on basis of speech's truthfulness will create self-
censorship because of courts' difficulties in ascertaining truthfulness).
252. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 694-70 (discussing relationship between fear and
First Amendment chill).
253. See id. at 695-96 (suggesting that fear of erroneous court determinations decreases
in direct relation to complexity and vagueness of legal concepts that demarcate protected
speech from unprotected speech).
254. See id. (discussing relationship between fear and First Amendment chill). However,
even a law encompassing the clearest demarcation between protected and unprotected speech
will have some chilling effect. Id. at 700. Due to the unavoidable cost and uncertainty of the
legal process, combined with the variability of an individual's risk-aversion, any regulation of
unprotected expressive conduct will deter some from engaging in expressive conduct that the
First Amendment protects. Id. at 700-01. Thus, the question in a First Amendment analysis
of a proposed definitional balance is not whether the proposed balance chills, but whether the
proposed definitional balance impermissibly chills. See id. at 701 (stating that determining the
constitutionality of legislative enactments involves ascertaining whether legislative enactments
chill exercise of First Amendment rights to point that judicial invalidation is necessary).
255. See supra notes 249-54 and accompanying text (discussing clarity of corrective view
definitional balance).
256. See infra notes 502-07 and accompanying text (discussing "four corners" rule).
257. See id. (same).
258. See id. (same).
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Any vagueness inherent in this analysis would be limited to situations
where the author's message was particularly subtleY-9 In such instances it
might be difficult for the courts to ascertain whether an interpretive artist's
performance has diverted from the author's message.260 Nonetheless, the
analysis would remain a simple process of comparison. 261 As a result, the
corrective view of moral rights continues to be a simple and fairly clear
demarcation between protected and unprotected speech, particularly when
compared to other demarcations that the United States Supreme Court has
accepted.2 2 Therefore, the corrective view of moral rights would not create
a significant probability of erroneous court decisions whose prospect would
deter interpretive artists from exercising their First Amendment rights. 263
259. See infra note 260 (discussing subtle speech in Samuel Beckett's play "Endgame").
260. See S. BEcEm-r, ENDOAmE (providing excellent illustration of difficulty courts might
face in attempting to apply correctional view to integrity rights claims involving subtle messages
in author's work). Mr. Beckett's play contains instructions to the actors specifying the number
of pauses the actors are to take between their lines. Id. at 1 (containing dialogue with specified
pauses). These pauses constitute a portion of Mr. Beckett's "message" that federal moral
rights legislation, incorporating the corrective view, would protect. See supra notes 234-35 and
accompanying text (discussing corrective view of moral rights). Clearly, however, this portion
of Mr. Beckett's message constitutes subtle direction to the interpretive artists. See S. BEcKIEr,
supra, at 1 (containing dialogue with specified pauses). As a result, an interpretive artist
choosing to perform Mr. Beckett's work would run the risk of a court erroneously holding
the interpretive artist responsible for omitting these pauses. See Schauer, supra note 197, at
695-96 (stating that probability of erroneous court determinations increases in direct relation
to complexity and vagueness of legal concepts that demarcate protected speech from unprotected
speech).
The difficulty in applying the corrective view of moral rights in certain instances makes
it imperative that federal moral rights legislation not employ remedies that will cause undue
First Amendment chill. See infra notes 265-84 and accompanying text (discussing First Amend-
ment chill that could result from various moral rights remedies).
261. See infra notes 502-07 and accompanying text (discussing "four corners" rule).
262. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 695-96, 698-99 (discussing vague statutes and their
chilling effect on exercise of free speech rights). In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1956), the court held that the First Amendment did not protect obscenity from state regulation.
The Court then went on to define obscenity: "Material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient (having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts) interest." Id. at 487
(explanation added). Despite repeated criticism that this demarcation is imprecise, the Court
has continued to uphold it as a definitional balance that is consistent with the interests of the
First Amendment. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that court has failed to define obscenity standards "with predictable
application to any given piece of material"). Compared to obscenity's demarcation between
protected and unprotected speech, the corrective view of moral rights has a much clearer
definition of unprotected speech: Speech that modifies the author's explicit communication as
contained in the author's work of performance art. See supra notes 249-61 and accompanying
text (discussing clarity of correctional view of moral rights).
263. In addition to the simplicity and basic clarity of the correctional view's demarcation
between protected and unprotected speech, the corrective view arguably avoids unconstitutional
chill because the interpretive artist could easily check his compliance with the federal legislation.
See Schauer, supra note 197, at 698 (stating that subjects of regulations are not only troubled
by possibility of court reaching erroneous determinations, but also by the uncertainty in their
own minds as to whether First Amendment protects their behavior). Because interpretive artists
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In view of the corrective view's compatibility with the First Amendment,
federal legislation encompassing this definitional balance should pass First
Amendment scrutiny.2 4 However, any First Amendment analysis of federal
performance art author moral rights legislation must extend beyond the
basic moral right to include the remedies used to enforce that right.26 These
remedies fall into three categories-monetary damages, injunctions, and
labeling. 2" In discussing these three remedies, this article will consider the
First Amendment issues raised by applying each remedy to the performance
art author's integrity and paternity rights respectively. 67
Because the imposition of monetary damages does not abridge directly
an individual's rights of free speech,2" First Amendment chill is the primary
First Amendment concern that monetary damages implicate.2 9 As previously
indicated, one of the primary factors that creates First Amendment chill is
the probability that court's erroneously will hold individuals liable for
exercising their First Amendments rights.270 Because of the basic clarity and
simplicity of the corrective view's demarcation between protected and un-
protected speedh, performance art author moral rights legislation using the
corrective view would not create a significant risk of erroneous court
determinations. 271 However, ascertaining the probability of erroneous court
determinations does not end a First Amendment chill analysis. To completely
quantify the chilling effect of a government regulation, one must factor the
probability of erroneous court determinations with the magnitude of harm
that a court would cause an individual by erroneously holding the individual
actually have access to authors' works of performance art, interpretive artists easily could
check their performances against the works of performance art authors to ascertain if
discrepancies exist between the two. See id. at 700 & n.69 (noting that where factual assertions
easily can be verified, no chill will result from requiring publishers to guarantee truth of his
statements). Thus, in some ways the interpretive artist is analogous to a commercial advertiser.
See Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Coniumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 777-
78 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that commercial advertising resists chill because
advertiser easily can verify truthfulness of their statements). In both instances, if the state
subjected the false or misleading components of their creations to regulation, their access to
the truth underlying their creations would help eliminate the danger of First Amendment chill.
264. See supra notes 236-63 and accompanying text (discussing corrective view's compat-
ibility with both First Amendment and non-First Amendment interests).
265. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text (discussing two-part approach to
analyzing First Amendment issues surrounding moral rights).
266. See infra notes 268-384 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment issues
that various moral rights remedies raise).
267. See id. (same).
268. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 696-97 (suggesting that use of fines to enforce
government law indirectly implicates First Amendment because of resulting chilling effect).
269. See id. (same).
270. See supra notes 249-54 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between fear
of erroneous court decisions and First Amendment chill).
271. See supra notes 246-63 and accompanying text (explaining how corrective view's
simple nature and analytic clarity forestalls chilling interpretive artist's exercise of First
Amendment rights).
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liable.z 2 Application of this formula to federal legislation using monetary
damages to enforce performance art author integrity rights, suggests that,
even where a low probability exists of erroneous court determinations,
monetary damages could be so traumatic for the perf6rmance art industry
that First Amendment chill would result.273
The financial resources of the typical performance art producer or
interpretive artist are relatively meager.274 As a result even moderate mon-
etary judgments could have a catastrophic impact.275 While the corrective
view of moral rights does not create a significant risk of erroneous court
determinations, the corrective view does not completely eradicate such a
risk either.276 Further, the numerous messages in any work of performance
art that afford courts countless opportunities to wrongfully hold interpretive
artists liable for integrity rights violations heighten the corrective view's
unavoidable risk. Therefore, when coupled with the catastrophic impact of
a monetary judgment, the slight but unavoidable risk of courts erroneously
holding interpretive artists liable for integrity rights violations would create
the necessary fear to deter interpretive artists from exercising their First
Amendment rights.2"7
While a monetary damage remedy might create First Amendment chill
if coupled with an integrity right, monetary damages might not cause First
Amendment chill if coupled with an author's paternity right? 87s Clearly, trial
courts wrongfully could hold interpretive artist liable for violating an
author's paternity rights. 279 However, the number of potential integrity rights
violations in any one performance does not compare to the limited number
of potential paternity rights violations. Further, the factual question under-
lying a paternity rights claim, (Did the interpretive artist attribute authorship
of the author's work to the author?), is a simple one for the courts to
resolve, and the inquiry does not vary much from one case to another.
272. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 694-96 (suggesting that First Amendment chill also
increases and decreases in direct relation to magnitude of harm that would result from erroneous
court determinations of liability).
273. See id. at 696-97 (discussing confluence of uncertainty of erroneous court determi-
nations and magnitude of resulting harm in creating First Amendment chill).
274. See infra notes 493-94 and accompanying text (discussing financial status of perform-
ance art entrepreneurs).
275. See id. (same).
276. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 700-01 (stating that because legal process is subject
to unavoidable errors, no demarcation between protected and unprotected speech completely
removes possibility of court wrongfully holding individual liable); see also supra notes 259-60
and accompanying text (discussing difficulties courts face in applying corrective view to integrity
rights claims involving subtle messages in author's work).
277. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 696-97 (discussing confluence of fear of erroneous
court determinations and magnitude of resulting harm in assessing First Amendment chill).
278. See infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text (discussing why coupling of paternity
right and monetary remedy does not create intolerable First Amendment chill).
279. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 700-01 (stating that due to unavoidable' uncertainty
of legal process, trial courts will make erroneous determinations of liability regardless of clarity
of demarcation between protected and unprotected speech).
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Thus, paternity rights claims have a tightly focused quality that reduces the
risk of erroneous court determinations to an extremely small probability. 210
Thus, even if coupled with monetary damages, paternity right claims would
not deter interpretive author's from exercising their First Amendment rights.281
If a monetary damages remedy for integrity rights violations implicates
First Amendment chill, then injunctive relief for integrity rights violations
suggests First Amendment freeze3m Federal moral rights legislation would
conflict with the First Amendment if it allowed courts, after they found a
potential integrity rights violation, to preliminarily. enjoin interpretive artists
from engaging in that particular expressive conduct. 2s3 Likewise, federal
moral rights legislation would create First Amendment problems if it per-
mitted courts, after finding an integrity rights violation, to enjoin interpretive
artists from performing an author's work at all.2" In both instances, the
courts would be imposing prior restraints.2a In other words the courts would
be preventing interpretive artists from disseminating material that the First
Amendment typically protects, absent a prior judicial determination that
the material does not have First Amendment protection.2 6 According to the
United States Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota,2" such judicial restraints
on interpretive artist's speech are unconstitutional.n 8
Conceivably, federal legislation protecting performance art authors'
integrity rights could use a more tailored injunctive remedy that might
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.z 9 For instance, the legislation could
limit a court's injunctive powers to enjoining specific expressive conduct
within a performance that the court previously has found to constitute an
integrity rights violation. Such tailored injunctive relief would avoid First
280. See id. at 695-96 (stating that fear of erroneous court determinations increases or
decreases in direct relation to complexity and vagueness of legal concepts demarcating protected
from unprotected speech).
281. See id. at 694-96 (discussing significance of erroneous court determinations to First
Amendment chill).
282. See A. BICKEL, Tim MoPA.rry oF CONSENT 61 (1975) (stating that prior restraints
freeze); see also Note, Remedies for Copyright Infringement: Respecting the First Amendment,
89 CoLum. L. Rv. 1940, 1942 (1989) (stating that First Amendment issues arise in copyright
cases because enjoining publication of book upon finding infringement may abridge alleged
infringer's right to freedom of speech).
283. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (holding that prepublication
injunction of protected speech violates First Amendment).
284. See id. (same).
285. See id. (same).
286. See Note, supra note 282, at 1946 (stating that prior restraints violate defendant's
constitutional rights because they prevent him from disseminating matters that First Amendment
ordinarily protects, absent prior judicial determination that material does not qualify for First
Amendment protection).
287. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
288. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718-19; see also New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (stating that any system of prior restraint of expression
comes to Court bearing heavy presumption against its constitutionality).
289. See infra notes 290-299 and accompanying text (discussing tailored injunctive remedy
for integrity rights violations).
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Amendment difficulties because, according to the corrective view of moral
rights, the First Amendment does not protect speech that actually is found
to constitute an integrity rights violation.2 Thus, tailored injunctive relief
only would forestall the dissemination of speech that a court previously has
found to be unprotected. 291 As a result, tailored injunctive relief would not
constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint.2
While a tailored injunctive remedy might avoid First Amendment freeze
as a prior restraint, the remedy might still lead to unconstitutional chill if
used as an integrity rights remedy. 293 As previously stated, the corrective
view of moral rights does not eradicate completely the risk of erroneous
court determinations, 29 particularly where portions of an author's work of
performance art contain subtle messages. 29s If this slight risk of erroneous
court determinations is coupled with a moral rights remedy that could cause
significant harm to an interpretive artist, First Amendment chill would
result. 29
Admittedly, a court order enjoining an interpretive artist from engaging
in certain expressive conduct found to be violative of an author's integrity
rights, at first consideration, does not appear to be especially onerous.
However, were a court to hold an interpretive artist in contempt for violating
such an order, the resulting punishment would be very severe. 29 Thus,
where a court has enjoined an interpretive artist from engaging in specific
expressive conduct that violates an author's integrity rights, the prospect of
a court erroneously holding an interpretive artist in contempt for violating
the order, combined with the severity of the resulting punishment, would
deter many interpretive artists from engaging in protected speech falling
close to the boundaries of the court's injunction. 29 In other words, a
290. See Note, supra note 282, at 1946 (suggesting that interpretive artist's First Amend-
ment rights would not be violated if court only enjoined speech that court previously determined
was unprotected); see also supra notes 234-35 (discussing corrective view of moral rights).
291. See Note, supra note 282, at 1946 (suggesting that interpretive artist's First Amend-
ment rights would not be violated if court only enjoined speech that court previously determined
was unprotected).
292. See id. (same).
293. See supra notes 289-92 and accompanying text (discussing why tailored injunctive
remedy chills interpretive artists from exercising their First Amendment rights).
294. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 700-01 (stating that due to unavoidable uncertainty
of legal process, no demarcation between protected and unprotected speech completely removes
risk of erroneous court determinations).
295. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties courts face in
applying corrective view to integrity rights claims involving subtle messages in author's work).
296. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 696-97 (stating that First Amendment chill is product
of uncertainty of erroneous court determination and magnitude of harm that would result
from erroneous court determination).
297. See A. BICKEL, supra note 282, at 61 (suggesting that court would hold violator of
injunction in contempt).
298. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 696-97 (stating that First Amendment chill is product
of uncertainty of erroneous court determination and magnitude of harm that would result
from erroneous court determinations).
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tailored injunction against integrity rights violations would unconstitutionally
chill interpretive artists from exercising their First Amendment freedoms.29
While tailored injunctive relief for integrity rights violations irreconcil-
ably conflicts with the First Amendment,3 °° tailored injunctive relief for
paternity rights creates fewer First Amendment problems.3 ' Obviously, if
in response to a single paternity rights violation, a court could enjoin an
entire performance of an author's work, the injunction would constitute a
prior restraint on protected speech.3°s However, an injunctive remedy for
paternity rights violations would not constitute a prior restraint if the remedy
only allowed courts to permanently enjoin interpretive artists from failing
to give proper attribution to the author.30 3 Such a tailored injunctive remedy
would permit courts to enjoin only specific speech that the court first
classified as unprotected due to its failure to properly attribute authorship. 304
This form of an injunction would not be a prior restraint. 3 5
Further, tailored injunctions to enforce performance art author paternity
rights would not create First Amendment chill.306 Although the interpretive
artist would face serious punishment for violating a court order enjoining
299. See id. (same). To some extent federal moral rights legislation could counteract the
chill that results from a tailored injunctive or monetary remedy by conditioning liability for
integrity rights violations on a showing that the interpretive artist intended to violate the
performance art author's integrity rights. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
283 (1964) (holding that, in order to avoid First Amendment chill created by common law
libel action, public figure must prove all common law elements of libel plus actual malice).
Such a condition would create in a effect a buffer zone against liability for interpretive artists
engaging in protected speech falling close to the boundaries of unprotected speech. See Schauer,
supra note 197, at 706-07 (discussing buffer zone against liability that New York Times v.
Sullivan's malice standard creates for individual's engaging in speech whose truthfulness is
hard for court to ascertain).
However, while such a scienter requirement reduces the tension between the First Amend-
ment and monetary and injunctive remedies, such a requirement frustrates one of the chief
purposes underlying moral rights legislation, protection of the author's personality interests.
See Amnimick, supra note 22, at 37 (describing author's manifestation of his personality into
his art). Regardless of whether or not an interpretive artist intends to modify an author's
work, a modification will harm the author's personality interests. Conditioning integrity rights
liability on a showing of intent would allow many violations of an author's personality interests
to go unremedied.
300. See supra notes 289-299 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment diffi-
culties surrounding tailored injunctive remedy for integrity rights violations).
301. See infra notes 302-11 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment and
tailored injunctive remedy for paternity rights violations).
302. See Note, supra note 282, at 1946 (stating that regulations constitute prior restraints
if they prevent individual from disseminating matters ordinarily protected by First Amendment,
absent prior judicial determination that material does not qualify for First Amendment
protection).
303. See id. (suggesting that interpretive artist's First Amendment rights would not be
violated if court only enjoined speech that court previously determined was unprotected).
304. See id. (same).
305. See id. (same).
306. See supra notes 301-05 and 307-11 and accompanying text (discussing First Amend-
ment chill and injunctive remedies for paternity rights violations).
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integrity or paternity rights violations,3°0 injunctions to enforce paternity
rights carry with them much less risk of erroneous court determinations.3°8
As previously discussed, determining whether a paternity rights violation
has occurred would be a straightforward inquiry for the courts, one that
would not vary substantially from case to case.3°0 Likewise, affording correct
attribution to the author would be a simple task for the performance art
author.31 0 Thus, although the punishment for violating a court order en-
joining paternity rights violations would be severe, when coupled with the
slight risk of erroneous court determinations, tailored injunctive relief would
not deter interpretive artists from engaging in protected speech.
31 '
This First Amendment analysis of moral rights remedies concludes with
a consideration of the First Amendment issues surrounding a labeling remedy
for integrity rights violations. In the context of moral rights, the term
"labeling" encompasses a court ordered declaration, placed in the credits
or advertisements of the production at issue, that communicates to the
public a message that the production of the author's work of performance
art objectionably diverges from the text of the author's work.3 12 This is a
rudimentary definition. A fully developed labeling remedy would resolve
such issues as whether the court or the author creates the declaration and
whether the size of the declaration is fixed or whether it varies in relation
to the size and nature of the particular credit or advertisement.33 Nonethe-
less, this definition will suffice as the starting point for a First Amendment
analysis of an integrity rights labeling remedy.
314
An examination of the above described labeling remedy reveals that it
would affect two distinct classifications of speech: (1) the expressive conduct
that the interpretive artists places in the production at issue; and (2) the
speech that the interpretive artist places in the production's credits or
307. See A. BICKEL, supra note 282, at 61 (suggesting that court would hold violator of
injunction in contempt).
308. See supra notes 279-81 and accompanying text (discussing risk of erroneous court
determinations when applying paternity right).
309. See id. (same).
310. See id. (same).
311. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 696-97 (stating that First Amendment chill is product
of uncertainty of erroneous court determinations and magnitude of harm that would result
from erroneous court determinations).
312. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 52 (defining labeling remedy as "a court's declaration
that a work as to which a violation of the integrity interest has been found but as to which
no injunction is to be granted must indicate, on its credits and advertisements, that the author's
work has been tampered with").
313. See infra notes 314-84 and accompanying text (discussing various aspects of labeling
remedy for performance art author moral rights).
314. Diverging from the discussion of injunctive relief and monetary damages, this article
will not discuss the suitability of labeling as a paternity rights remedy, primarily because an
injunction enforcing an author's paternity rights effectively constitutes a labeling remedy. See
supra notes 301-I1 and accompanying text (discussing injunctive enforcement of performance
art author paternity rights).
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advertisements. 35 Considering the first of these two classifications, because
a labeling remedy would not suppress directly any of the messages an
interpretive artist places in the performance of an author's work, 316 the
remedy does not constitute a prior restraint. 317 Therefore, a First Amendment
analysis must focus on whether or not the labeling remedy would create
First Amendment chill by .deterring the interpretive artist from inserting
protected speech into the Performance of the author's work.
38
Whether or not a labeling remedy would cause this form of First
Amendment chill depends on the confluence of the two basic factors
previously discussed-the probability that courts erroneously would hold
interpretive artist's liable for integrity rights violations, coupled with the
magnitude of harm that such erroneous court determinations would cause
interpretive artists. 31 9 The probability of erroneous court determinations
primarily is a function of the clarity and simplicity of moral rights legisla-
tion's demarcation between protected and unprotected speech. 320 Assuming
federal moral rights legislation incorporated the corrective view of moral
rights, the demarcation between protected and unprotected speech would be
fairly clear and simple in application.32 ' Thus, the corrective view of moral
rights significantly would decrease the risk of erroneous court determina-
tions. 322
However, despite the basic clarity and simplicity of the corrective view,
this demarcation still possesses enough ambiguity to deter interpretive artists
from inserting protected speech into their performances, assuming that an
integrity rights labeling remedy caused harm comparable to the harm that
injunctive and monetary remedies cause.323 However, of the three remedies,
315. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 52 (positing definition of labeling that suggests
remedy is contingent on interpretive artist engaging in expressive conduct in two contexts: (1)
during performance of author's work; and (2) within credits or advertisements for performance).
316. See supra note 312 and accompanying text (defining labeling remedy).
317. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 711-12 (1931) (stating that statute suppressing
publication of offending newspaper violates First Amendment); Note, supra note 282, at 1946
(stating that prior restraints violate defendant's constitutional rights because they prevent him
from disseminating matters that First Amendment ordinarily protects absent prior judicial
determination that material does not qualify for First Amendment protection).
318. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 687 (discussing importance of chilling effect to First
Amendment analysis).
319. See id. at 696-97 (stating that First Amendment chill is product of uncertainty of
erroneous court determinations coupled with magnitude of harm that would result from
erroneous court determinations).
320. See id. at 695-96 (suggesting that fear of erroneous court determinations decreases
in direct relation to complexity and vagueness of legal concepts that demarcate protected
speech from unprotected speech).
321. See supra notes 249-61 and accompanying text (discussing simplicity and clarity of
corrective view's demarcation between protected and unprotected speech).
322. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 695-96 (suggesting that fear of erroneous court
determinations increases and decreases in direct relation to complexity and vagueness of legal
concepts that demarcate protected speech from unprotected speech).
323. See supra notes 269-77 and accompanying text (discussing chilling effect that would
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labeling, far and away, would cause the least amount of harm to interpretive
artists.32 4 Compared to the devastating effect of monetary damages, placing
court ordered declarations into preexisting credits or advertisements would
be much less expensive for many interpretive artists.12 Perhaps the most
serious economic risk that a labeling remedy creates for the interpretive
artist is the danger that the declaration would reduce the economic potential
of the production at issue.32 6 On the other hand, if recent history is any
guide, such declarations may create controversy that only would increase
the production's economic potential. 2 7
Moreover, a labeling remedy for integrity rights violations would cause
significantly less harm than a court injunction protecting the same author's
right.as Because ascertaining whether an interpretive artist has complied
with a labeling order is a much simpler task for the courts than ascertaining
whether an interpretive artist has breached an injunction protecting an
author's integrity rights, the risk of courts erroneously holding an interpre-
tive artist in contempt for noncompliance with a labeling order is de
minimis. 329 As a result, interpretive artists are less likely to face the serious
harm that can be the end result of a court order enjoining an interpretive
artist from violating an author's integrity rights.3 0 Because an integrity
result from coupling of corrective view and monetary damage remedy for integrity rights
violations); supra notes 293-299 and accompanying text (discussing chilling effect that would
result from coupling of corrective view and injunctive remedy for integrity rights violation).
324. See supra notes 293-299 and accompanying text (discussing slight harm that would
result from coupling corrective view with integrity rights labeling remedy).
325. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 53 (stating that labeling might forestall performance
art author's "blackmail" efforts).
326. See id. (stating that labeling might reduce economic potential of interpretive artist's
production).
327. See Bell, Some Final Words on Critics of the 'Last Temptation of Christ', L.A.
Times, Oct. 13, 1988, at 6, col. 4 (stating that controversy surrounding "Last Temptation of
Christ" aided its profitability); Browne, The Music Business Watches Its Own Step, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 23, 1990, at 26, col I (stating that warning labels and police harassment have
transformed "2 Live Crew" record into multi-million seller).
328. See infra notes 329-30 and accompanying text (discussing how labeling integrity rights
remedy would cause less harm than injunctive relief for integrity rights violations).
329. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 695-96 (suggesting that fear of erroneous court
determinations decreases in direct relation to complexity and vagueness of legal concepts that
demarcate protected speech from unprotected speech).
330. See A. BICKEL, supra note 282, at 61 (stating that where individual violates court
order, he faces court holding him in contempt). One last First Amendment issue arises from
the labeling remedy's effect on the speech contained in the interpretive artist's performance of
the author's work. Because the labeling remedy essentially is a forced right of access to certain
public communications that the interpretive artist publishes, and because this right of access
is contingent on the interpretive artist engaging in certain speech, the labeling remedy might
constitute a content-based right-of-access. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n
of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (stating that Commission's order to place newsletter of third
party in utility's billing envelope constituted content-based right-of-access); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (stating Florida right-of-reply statute
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rights labeling remedy would not burden interpretive artists unduly,33 any
ambiguity in federal legislation employing the corrective view will not deter
interpretive artists from exercising their First Amendment rights when per-
forming an author's work of performance art. 3 2
While the labeling remedy does not significantly chill the protected
speech in the interpretive artist's performance, as previously suggested, a
labeling remedy would affect another category of. speech: the interpretive
artist's credits or advertisements.333 Because a labeling remedy limits the
placement of court ordered declarations to the interpretive artist's 'credits
or advertisements, the remedy would affect the speech that interpretive
artists place in such public communications.
334
For purposes of a First Amendment analysis, the exact nature of the
labeling remedy's effect on the speech contained in interpretive artists'
public communications is very significant. First, because the speech in these
public communications does not constitute integrity right violations, the
labeling remedy solely would affect speech that the First Amendment
exacted penalty on basis of content of paper).
In both Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo and Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n of Cal., the Court held that certain content-based rights-of-access violated the
First Amendment. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 9; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. According to the
Court, these content-based rights-of-access violated the First Amendment because they punished
the speaker for engaging in the protected speech that triggered the right-of-access. Pacific Gas,
475 U.S. at 10; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257. Thus, the right-of-access discouraged the speakers
from engaging in the protected speech. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 10; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
However, the labeling remedy deters and is triggered by speech that is very different from
the speech that triggered the rights-of-access in Pacific Gas and Tornillo. In both of these
cases the First Amendment fully protected the speech triggering the right-of-access. See Pacific
Gas, 475 U.S. 13-14 (stating that utility's expression of viewpoint that is hostile to third party
triggers third party's right-of-access); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 244 (stating that statute affords
right-of-reply to political candidate if newspaper criticizes his record or character). Thus, the
regulations in Pacific Gas and Tornillo directly chilled protected speech. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S.
at 14; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257. In the case of labeling, unprotected speech triggers the
remedy (i.e., speech that modifies the author's message). See supra notes 312-14 and accom-
panying text (discussing mechanics of labeling remedy); supra notes 234-35 and accompanying
text (describing corrective view of moral rights). Therefore, the labeling remedy only directly
chills unprotected speech. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text (discussing corrective
view of moral rights). While the labeling remedy peripherally may chill protected speech (i.e.,
speech that does not modify the author's expression), the previous analysis in this article has
demonstrated that this chill is not constitutionally significant. See supra notes 318-29 and
accompanying text (discussing First Amendment chill and labeling remedy).
331. See supra notes 324 and 330 and accompanying text (discussing harm integrity rights
labeling remedy would cause interpretive artists as compared to monetary damages and
injunctions).
332. Schauer, supra note 197, at 696-97 (stating that First Amendment chill is product of
uncertainty of erroneous court determinations coupled with magnitude of harm that would
result from erroneous court determinations).
333. See supra note 315 and accompanying text (discussing two classifications of speech
that labeling remedy affects).
334. See id. (same).
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protects. 3 5 Second, because an interpretive artist only can trigger a labeling
remedy by publishing public communications pertaining to the wrongful
performance of the author's work,33 6 the labeling remedy in effect would
punish interpretive artists for engaging in protected speech. 37
The United States Supreme Court has looked with great disfavor on
governmental regulations, like the labeling remedy, that have the above
described qualities. 33 The Court has termed them compelled access 3 9 or
content-based rights-of-access. 340 According to the Court, such rights of
compelled access deter speakers from engaging in the protected speech that
triggers the compelled access. 341 Further, the Court has held that rights of
compelled access force the penalized speakers to alter their speech to
conform to another's agenda. 342
On two occasions the Court has struck down rights of compelled access
as violative of the First Amendment ;343 however, the Court has not created
335. See supra notes 234-63 and accompanying text (discussing corrective view of moral
rights). This statement assumes that the speech contained in these public communications does
not fall into one of the other unprotected categories of speech (i.e., obscenity or libel).
336. See supra note 312 and accompanying text (discussing definition of integrity rights
labeling remedy).
337. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986)
(stating that compelled access penalizes expression of particular points of view); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (striking down Florida statute that exacts
penalty on basis of content of newspaper).
338. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 11 (holding that Commission's order requiring utility
to place newsletter of third party in its billini envelopes constitutes compelled access that
violates utility's First Amendment rights); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257 (holding that right-of-
reply statute that forces newspaper to print messages from speakers with whom paper disagrees
constitutes compelled access in violation of newspaper's First Amendment rights).
339. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 9 (terming Commission's order to place newsletter in utility's
billing envelope compelled access); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (terming right-of-access statute
compulsory access).
340. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 15 (stating that commission's order to place newsletter
of third party in utility's billing envelope constitutes content based grant of access); Tornillo,
418 U.S. at 256 (stating Florida right-of-reply statute exacts penalty on basis of content of
paper).
341. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 9; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.
342. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (stating that
compulsory access law intrudes on function of editors).
343. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 20-21; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257. In Tornillo, the Court
considered whether a Florida right-of-reply statute violated the First Amendment. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974). The statute provided that if a newspaper assailed a political
candidate's record or character, the newspaper would have to print, free of cost to the
candidate, any reply to the newspaper's charges that the candidate submitted. Id. at 244.
The Court characterized this right-of-reply statute as coercive. Id. at 256. The Court also
stated that the statute exacted a penalty on the basis of newspaper content by forcing newspapers
to incur the costs of printing and composing the candidates' replies. Id. at 256. These costs
included the expenses that newspapers would incur from forgoing coverage of other topics in
order to afford adequate space for candidates' replies. Id. at 256-57. The Court concluded
that these penalties would create First Amendment chill because newspaper editors would forgo
assailing political candidates to avoid the above described costs. Id. at 257. As an alternative
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a per se rule against such rights.3" Nor has the Court created a strong
presumption against their constitutionality, 34 as it did in the case of prior
restraints. 346 Instead the Court has focused on whether compelled access is
properly tailored and whether it serves an important governmental interest. 7
This examination varies in relation to the nature of the speech that compelled
access regulates. 3" If the regulated speech is political in nature, the actual
test is straightforward and stringent: compelled access must be a narrowly
tailored means that promotes a compelling state interest.
3 49
If the regulated speech is commercial speech, then the Court uses a less
stringent, if more cumbersome, four-part test.350 First, the First Amendment
must protect the regulated speech.351 To obtain such protection, the speech
must be lawful and not misleading. 3 2 Second, the regulation at issue must
serve a substantial governmental interest.5 3 Third, the regulation directly
must advance the asserted governmental interest.354 Finally, the regulation
basis for its holding, the Court concluded that the right-of-reply statute violated the First
Amendment because it intruded on the function of the editor. Id. at 258.
In Pacific Gas, the Court considered whether the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) could require a privately owned utility to include a third party's hostile newsletter in
the utility's billing envelopes. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 4. After concluding that the First
Amendment fully protected the utility's newsletter, the Court held that CPUC's order consti-
tuted compelled access that both penalized the utility's point of view and forced it to alter its
speech in accordance with an agenda it did not set. Id. at 8-12.
The Court then noted that CPUC's order could be valid if it was a narrowly tailored
means to a compelling state interest. Id. CPUC alleged one compelling interest: The order
furthered the State's interest in effective ratemaking proceedings. Id. at 19. However, the
Court went on to conclude that the State could serve that interest through means other than
those violating the utility's First Amendment rights. Id. CPUC attempted to assert that because
the order disseminated a number of views to CPUC's customers, the order advanced the state's
compelling interest in promoting free speech. Id. at 20. Rejecting this claim, the Court noted
that the State could not promote free speech through the use of a content-based ight-of-
access that advanced some points of view while burdening the expression of others. Id.
344. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 19 (stating that compelled access could be valid if it were
narrowly tailored means of serving compelling state interest).
345. See id. (same).
346. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
347. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 19 (stating that content-based compelled access can
withstand First Amendment scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored and serves compelling state
interest).
348. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 & 19
(stating that because First Amendment fully protected utility's newspaper, order compelling
access must be narrowly tailored means to serve compelling state interest); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (outlining four part
First Amendment analysis for commercial speech cases).
349. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 19.
350. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (outlining four-part First Amendment test to
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must be narrowly tailored. 55 In the context of commercial speech, the term
"narrowly tailored" has a fairly relaxed meaning: a reasonable fit between
the governmental interest and the regulation used to achieve it.356
Before applying either of these tests to an integrity rights labeling
remedy, one must ascertain whether the affected speech is political or
commercial speech.3 57 Although what constitutes political speech is fairly
amorphous, the Court specifically has defined what constitutes commercial
speech: speech that solicits a commercial transaction.355 As previously dis-
cussed, a labeling remedy would afford the performance art author a right-
of-access to the interpretive artist's credits and advertisements pertaining to
the production at issue.359 If the interpretive artist charged an admission fee
to the performance of the author's work, then one could characterize these
credits or advertisements as soliciting a commercial transaction, and thus,
they would constitute commercial speech.316
If an interpretive artist's credits and advertisements constitute commer-
cial speech, then satisfying the four-part commercial speech test is a simple
matter. Because the interpretive artist's integrity rights violations are con-
tained in the performance of the author's work, rather than in the adver-
tisements and credits, 361 these public communications presumably are not
355. See id. (stating that law regulating commercial speech must not be more extensive
than is necessary to serve substantial interest).
356. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
357. See supra notes 343-56 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment analysis
for political and commercial speech).
358. Board of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 473 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
359. See supra note 312 and accompanying text (defining labeling remedy).
360. See Board of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 473 (stating that commercial speech proposes
commercial transaction). Public communications soliciting the public to pay money to view a
performance of an author's work, also may contain political speech. See id. at 475 (discussing
commercial advertisement that links commercial product to public debate). For example, a
playbill advertising the performance of a play about the Vietnam War may depict scenes from
war that effectively constitute commentary about the Vietnam War.
However, unless political speech is "inextricably intertwined" with commercial speech,
communications containing both forms of speech do not gain the status of political speech.
Id. at 474. Commercial speech is inextricably intertwined with political speech if either a law
of man or nature requires the presence of both types of speech. See id. (stating that
communications did not contain commercial speech inextricably linked with political speech
because no law of man or nature required commercial speech to be coupled with political
speech). In the case of the playbill no law of man or nature requires the playbill to include
depictions of the Vietnam War to fulfill its commercial purpose of selling tickets to the
performance. See id. (same). Therefore, the playbill retains its status as commercial speech.
Id.; see also Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796
(1988) (holding that state-law requirement that fundraising organizations for charities include
statistics in their solicitations describing amount of money turned over to charities within
previous twelve months constituted commercial speech that was inextricably intertwined with
political speech).
361. See supra notes 234-60, 362-63 and accompanying text (discussing corrective view of
moral rights).
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misleading nor unlawful. 362 Thus, the First Amendment protects these public
communications.3 63
Having satisfied the first prong of the commercial speech four-part test,
a substantial state interest must underlie the labeling remedy.364 The primary
purpose of an integrity rights labeling remedy is to protect the personality
interests of performance art authors. 65 Because protecting performance art
authors' personality interests would promote the useful arts in accordance
with the Copyright Clause,36 a substantial governmental interest underlies
the labeling remedy. 67 Because labeling would afford performance art
authors with a method to correct distortions to their work, the remedy
satisfies the next prong of the four-part test: labeling directly advances the
substantial state interest.36 Finally, because labeling would not place a
substantial economic burden on the performance art industry 69 and because
labeling is the only moral rights remedy that would not significantly chill
the protected political speech that interpretive artists insert into their per-
formances,3 70 a reasonable fit exists between the labeling remedy and its end
of protecting the author's personality interests.371 Thus, the labeling remedy
is narrowly tailored.
3 72
If the interpretive artist's public communications constitute commercial
speech, then the four-part test suggests that labeling withstands a First
362. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (stating that First Amendment protects commercial speech if speech is lawful and
truthful).
363. See id. (stating that first prong of First Amendment analysis of law regulating
commercial speech is whether First Amendment protects commercial speech).
364. See id. (stating that substantial state interest must underlie state law regulating
commercial speech if law is to withstand First Amendment challenge).
365. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (discussing how moral rights protects
author's personality interests).
366. See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text (discussing how moral rights promote
useful arts, thereby complying with dictates of Copyright Clause).
367. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (stating that substantial state interest must underlie state law regulating commercial
speech if law is to withstand First Amendment challenge).
368. Id. (stating that law regulating commercial speech only will withstand First Amend-
ment challenge if it directly advances its underlying substantial state interest); see infra note
511 and accompanying text (discussing how labeling remedy effectively protects author's
personality interests).
369. See infra notes 511-12 and accompanying text (discussing slight economic impact of
labeling on performance art industry).
370. See supra notes 265-311 and accompanying text (discussing various moral rights
remedies and whether they significantly chill interpretive artists from inserting fully protected
speech into their performances).
371. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989) (stating that government must demonstrate that law regulating commercial speech
reasonably fits interest it seeks to promote).
372. See id. (interpreting "narrowly tailored" to mean "reasonable fit" in context of
commercial speech).
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Amendment challenge. 7  However, if the interpretive artist's public com-
munications do not promote a commercial transaction, perhaps because the
performance is free to the public, the interpretive artist's public communi-
cations might constitute political speech. 74 Assuming this is true, the labeling
remedy would have to be a narrowly tailored means of advancing a
compelling state interest.3 75 As discussed in the commercial speech analysis
of labeling, the primary purpose of the labeling remedy is to protect the
author's personality interests.3 76 Because protecting authors' personality in-
terests promotes the useful arts3 77 and accords with the dictates of the
Copyright Clause,3 78 this purpose constitutes a compelling governmental
interest.37
9
If a compelling interest underlies the integrity rights labeling remedy, 380
the remedy must be a narrowly tailored means of advancing that interest if
the remedy is to withstand a First Amendment challenge.3 8' Labeling is
narrowly tailored for two reasons. First, labeling is the only moral rights
remedy that would protect the author's personality interests without signif-
icantly chilling the protected speech that interpretive-artists' inject into their
performances. 3 2 Second, labeling would not unduly burden the economic
health of the performance art industry. 383 Thus, the labeling remedy with-
stands a First Amendment challenge regardless of whether the interpretive
artist's public communications are commercial speech or political speech. 38 4
One final constitutional issue that any federal legislation recognizing
performance art authors' moral rights must address, is the place within such
373. See supra notes 364-72 and accompanying text (stating that labeling remedy satisfies
four-part test for commercial speech).
374. See Board of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 481 (stating that commercial speech proposes
commercial transaction).
375. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986)
(stating that compelled access must be narrowly tailored means of promoting compelling state
interest to withstand First Amendment challenge).
376. See infra note 511 and accompanying text (discussing how labeling remedy protects
performance art author personality interests).
377. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing how moral rights promote
useful arts).
378. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing "The Congress shall have Power ...
[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
379. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 19 (stating that state's interest in effective electrical
ratemaking proceedings may be compelling).
380. See supra notes 376-78 and accompanying text (discussing compelling interests un-
derlying integrity rights remedy).
381. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986).
382. See supra notes 265-311 and accompanying text (discussing various moral rights
remedies and whether they significantly chill interpretive artists from inserting protected speech
into their performances).
383. See infra notes 511-14 and accompanying text (discussing slight economic impact of
labeling on performance art industry).
384. See supra notes 333-83 and accompanying text (discussing whether labeling remedy
withstands First Amendment challenge if it affects commercial speech or political speech in
interpretive artist's public communications).
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legislation for the fair use doctrine.385 The fair use doctrine excludes from
copyright liability certain limited, expressive uses of copyrighted material.
386
These expressive uses include the utilization of copyrighted material for
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, criticism, and comment. 3 7 The latter
two uses encompass parody and satire. 388 As enacted, the members of
Congress did not intend fair use to relate in any way to First Amendment
concerns like the free flow of ideas or First Amendment chill. 389 Rather,
the members of Congress intended the federal incarnation of fair use to be
only a restatement of the common-law fair use privilege.39°
Nonetheless, despite these intentions, the federal courts and commen-
tators have expanded the fair use doctrine to encompass First Amendment
concerns, 39' including the fostering of the free flow of ideas and the
promotion of creative activity. 392 Professor Kwall, for example, has taken
the additional step of suggesting that fair use would limit the scope of any
moral rights recognition within the United States.3 93 This alleged limitation
on the scope of moral rights recognition stems from a perceived conflict
between fair use and moral rights. 394 Moral rights protect the performance
art author's personality interests both by ensuring that authorship is properly
attributed and by preventing harmful distortions to an author's work.395
Fair use conflicts with moral rights because the doctrine would allow
385. See infra notes 386-409 and accompanying text (discussing fair use and performance
art author moral rights).
386. See infra notes 387-409 and accompanying text (discussing fair use doctrine).
387. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
388. Kwall, supra note 29, at 66-67.
389. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADmiN. NEws 5678, 5680 (stating that federal fair use privilege encompasses general
scope of judicial doctrine of fair use).
390. Id.
391. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171,
1174 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that fair use doctrine serves to eliminate potential conflicts between
copyright and free speech); Kwall, supra note 29, at 65 (suggesting that federal fair use avoids
conflict between copyright and First Amendment); see generally Goldstein, Copyright and the
First Amendment, 70 CoLtrm. L. REv. 983 (1970) (recognizing need to resolve conflict between
copyright laws and First Amendment).
392. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 65 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984), for proposition that fair use reflects Congress' attempt to balance interests
of authors against such First Amendment interests as free flow of ideas and creativity).
393. Id. at 68 (suggesting that fair use will limit United States recognition of moral rights).
Professor Kwall has stated:
Our deep rooted tradition of free speech stemming from the first amendment's
mandate requires the same balance of interests when a creator alleges violations of
his personal, rather than pecuniary, rights .... Important social policies underlying
section 107 may compel a creator's acceptance of perceived mutilations, unwarranted
criticisms, and even objectionable contextual uses of his work.
Id. (citations omitted).
394. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 68-69 (stating that fair use may compel author's
acceptance of certain integrity rights violations).
395. Amarnick, supra note 22, at 37.
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individuals to use the author's work for certain purposes without giving
proper attribution.196 Further, fair use permits certain kinds of serious
distortions that integrity rights expressly prohibit, including parodies and
satires.3 97 Because of the perceived First Amendment purposes underlying
fair use, federal moral rights recognition would have to make significant
accommodations to fair use.
398
However, because of a number of restrictions on the fair use doctrine
that the federal courts have developed, fair use will have little impact on
federal performance art author moral rights.399 The first of these restrictions
is that fair use has no applicability if an individual violates an author's
copyright while performing a textual, verbatim copy of the author's work.400
Because most moral rights violations would occur when the interpretive
artist allegedly is performing a textual, verbatim version of the author's
work, fair use often would not protect the interpretive artist from a federal
moral rights cause of action. 401
Another restriction on fair use that would limit its impact on federal
moral rights is the "recall or conjure up" test.4°2 Whenever an individual
has performed less than a exact rendition of an author's work, federal
courts will deny that individual the protection of fair use, provided the
performance incorporates more of the original than is necessary to "recall
or conjure up" the copyright holder's work. 403 As in the case of the
"verbatim rule," federal courts presumably would apply the "recall or
396. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 68 (suggesting that fair use may permit individuals to
use excerpts of author's work without giving proper attribution to author).
397. See id. (suggesting that fair use will excuse certain integrity rights violations). In
determining whether the federal fair use doctrine would excuse particular personality right
violations, the courts, in addition to ommon law, probably would look to the four factors
that Congress mentions in section 107:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purpose;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
398. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 68 (incorporating fair use into moral rights recognition
requires balancing of interests).
399. See infra notes 400-08 and accompanying text (discussing fair use restrictions that
will limit doctrine's impact on performance art author moral rights).
400. See Benny v. Lowe's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956) (stating that fact that
serious dramatic work is copied practically verbatim and then presented with actors walking
on their hands or with other grotesquiries, does not avoid infringement of copyright), aff'd
by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1959), reh'd denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958).
401. See id. at 536 (same).
402. See Berlin v. E.C. Pub. Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating that fair use
is inapplicable where defendant incorporates more of copyright holder's work than is necessary
to recall or conjure up work), cert denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
403. See id. (same).
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conjure up" test to limit the usefulness of the fair use doctrine to an
interpretive artist attempting to escape a moral rights claim.4°4 Thus, where
an interpretive artist performs a version of an author's work that only
slightly differs from the author's work of performance art, the interpretive
artist could not use fair use to shield himself from moral rights liability.405
The last restriction on fair use that will limit the doctrine's impact-on
federal moral rights legislation applies specifically to satires or parodies of
an author's work.406 Any parody or satire of a copyrighted work claiming
the protection of fair use must "do more than merely achieve a comic
effect. It must also make some critical comment or statement about the
original work which reflects the original perspective of the parodist [or
satirist]-thereby giving the parody [or satire] social value beyond its enter-
tainment function.'"'
As applied to federal moral rights, if an'individual performed a satire or
parody of an author's work without injecting the necessary critical comment,
the individual would not escape moral rights liability through the use of
the fair use doctrine.
40 8
To summarize what has been an extensive discussion of the constitutional
issues surrounding performance art author moral rights, constitutional im-
pediments to recognition of performance art author moral rights, while
substantial, are not insurmountable. Beyond limiting the duration of any
moral right, the Copyright Clause does not present any impediment to
according moral rights to performance art authors.40 The First Amendment
presents the more significant obstacles, but they too are not overwhelming.
First, because copyright's idea/expression dichotomy is unworkable as
a definitional balance for performance art author moral rights,410 federal
legislation will have to be based on an alternative demarcation between
protected and unprotected speech.41' Adequate case support exists to create
the demarcation that this article has termed "the corrective view of moral
404. See id. (same).
405. See id. (same).
406. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prod. Inc., 479 F. Supp.
351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (stating that because copyright infringer failed to make critical
comment about infringed work, infringer's play was not satire and fair use did not apply);
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 467 F. Supp. 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y.) (suggesting
that parody and satire must contain critical commentary), order aff'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1979).
407. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 479 F. Supp. at 357.
408. See id. at 357 (holding that to obtain fair use protection, parody or satire must
contain critical commentary regarding original work).
409. See supra notes 156-81 and accompanying text (discussing copyright clause and
performance art author moral rights).
410. See supra notes 212-19 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacies of idea/
expression dichotomy as basis for definitional balance for performance art author moral rights).
411. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text (discussing necessity of workable
definitional balance if performance art author moral rights are to withstand First Amendment
challenge).
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rights. '41 2 The corrective view of moral rights is based on the proposition
that the performance art author's right to speak through his work is
meaningless without sufficient protections to ensure that the author's mes-
sage actually reaches the marketplace of ideas. 4 3 Because the corrective view
is a fairly clear and simple definitional balance, independent of the remedies
used to enforce the author's moral right, interpretive artist's will not be
unduly chilled from exercising their free speech rights when performing
authors' works.
414
First Amendment chill is a more significant problem when specific
remedies are attached to the performance art author's moral right. While
monetary damage remedies and injunctive remedies do not cause First
Amendment chill when coupled with an author's paternity right,4 5 these
same remedies would cause intolerable chill if moral rights legislation used
them to enforce an author's integrity right.4 16 However, a labeling remedy
could be an effective method of enforcing a performance art author's
integrity right without unduly chilling interpretive artists from exercising
their free speech rights when they either perform an author's work or issue
public communications pertaining to the performance. 4 7 Finally, due to
existing common-law restrictions on the fair use doctrine, fair use would




IV. IDENTIFICATION OF THE INTERESTS INVOLVED IN THE RECOGNITION OF
PERFORMANCE ART AUTHOR MORAL RIGHTS
Any federal legislation protecting the moral rights of performance art
authors will have to accommodate the disparate interests of the author,
entrepreneur, interpretive artist and public.4 9 In one fashion or another,
this article already has identified most of these interests; however, this
section will delineate them in a more complete and systematic fashion.
420
412. See supra notes 221-63 and accompanying text (discussing corrective view of moral
rights).
413. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text (describing corrective view of moral
rights).
414. See supra notes 246-63 and accompanying text (discussing corrective view and First
Amendment chill).
415. See supra notes 278-81 & 300-11 and accompanying text (discussing extent of First
Amendment chill resulting from joinder of paternity right with monetary damage remedy and
injunctive remedy).
416. See supra notes 269-77 & 293-299 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment
chill resulting from joinder of integrity right with monetary damage remedy or injunctive
remedy).
417. See supra notes 318-84 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment chill and
labeling remedy).
418. See supra notes 385-408 and accompanying text (discussing fair use and performance
art author moral right).
419. Amarnick, supra note 22, at 40 ; Kwall, supra note 29, at 92.
420. See infra notes 421-44 and accompanying text (discussing disparate interests surround-
ing federal recognition of performance art author moral rights).
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The interests of the performance art author fall into two major cate-
gories. 421 First, the author has a personality interest in his work, essentially
a right to prevent distortions to his work that harm the author's psyche.
4 2
Second, the author has a First Amendment interest in ensuring that his
speech actually reaches the marketplace of ideas in an undistorted form.423
In addition to these two major interests, the performance art author
has an ancillary interest that is related to the author's First Amendment
interest in ensuring that his message reaches the marketplace of ideas.
24
Simply put, the author has an interest in securing interpretive artists and
entrepreneurs to perform the author's work.425 Obviously, without such
421. See infra notes 422-28 and accompanying text (discussing performance art author
interests).
422. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text (discussing definition of performance
art author moral right). A broader view of moral rights would expand the author's personality
interests to include economic damage to the author as measured by harm to the author's
reputation. See Comment, supra note 28, at 477 (describing economic conception of moral
right); see also supra note 28 (discussing economic conception of moral right). Expanding an
author's personality interests to encompass these economic concerns raises questions as to
when an author's economic interests are at their peak and whether these interests ever decline.
See Davis, supra note 28, at 357-58 (discussing issues surrounding state visual artist moral
rights statutes that define integrity rights violations in terms of likelihood of damage to artist's
reputation). One response to these questions is that an author's economic interest in his work
is at its highest when the work is initially produced, and thereafter it declines. See Garon,
supra note 49, at 279 (stating that there is no interest as compelling as author's in initial
production). Often the initial production will determine whether an author's work subsequently
will be performed and published. Id. Because isolated performances will not harm a work's
overall reputation, once the public initially has viewed the author's work, and it has been
published, poorly done subsequent performances do not unduly threaten the author's economic
interests. See id. (stating that after initial performance, poor school production in Denver will
not affect market for play in Dallas).
While this assessment may have some validity, particularly for performance art that has
it origins in New York's mainstream fine arts communities, the assessment underestimates the
economic importance of subsequent performances in the increasingly decentralized performance
art industry. See Practical Perspectives, supra note 13, at 47-48 (stating that "[t]hese days,
with Broadway productions so hard to get-and I mean by established playwrights and
composers and lyricists-author's have just as much stake in a good regional production as
they used to have on Broadway").
Further, although a performance art author is often present for the initial production of
his work, and thus, can act as a check on interpretive artist abuses, economic realities prevent
the author's presence during subsequent productions, and thereby defeat a consistent check on
moral rights abuses. See id. (suggesting that integrity rights violations occur in subsequent
productions because original creators are no longer involved). Thus, if anything, the author
has a greater interest in the protection of his personality interests in subsequent productions
of his works than in the initial productions. See id. (same).
423. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978) (stating that
where speaker imminently threatens to drown out other points of view, such that democratic
process and other First Amendment interests are threatened, courts will consider whether state
action to silence voice is appropriate); see also supra notes 220-29 and accompanying text
(discussing First Amendment law that supports corrective view of moral rights).
424. See infra notes 425-28 and accompanying text (discussing author's interest in obtaining
interpretive artists and entrepreneurs to perform author's work).
425. Amarnick, supra note 22, at 42-43.
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individuals, an author has a much less significant chance of injecting his
message into the marketplace of ideas. 426 To a certain extent, this ancillary
interest conflicts with the author's personality interests. 427 In order to secure
the necessary interpretive artists and entrepreneurs, performance art authors
to some extent have to tolerate a certain amount of objectionable modifi-
cations to their works.
421
In addition to the interests of the performance art author, moral rights
recognition for the performance art author must also accommodate the
interests of the entrepreneurs who finance the production of an author's
work.4 29 The entrepreneur's principle interest is a financial one.4 0 No matter
what contractual arrangements the other participants in the performance
arts have obtained, the entrepreneur always has the most immediate and
the largest financial interest in the production of an author's work.43'
Entrepreneurs also have an interest in accommodating physical and
economical constraints when producing an author's work of performance
art.432 Because, physical and economical constraints often force compromises
in the performance of a work of performance art, the entrepreneur's interest
in accommodating these constraints often conflicts with performance art
author's personality interests. 433 For instance, entrepreneurs promoting tour-
426. Id. Of course, it is always possible that the public will read the author's work of
performance art and thereby disseminate the author's message. However, because publication
often depends on an initial, successful performance of the work, the author needs interpretive
artists and entrepreneurs to obtain even this limited dissemination of his work. See Garon,
supra note 49, at 279 (stating that publication of author's play conditioned on successful first
performance).
427. See infra note 428 and accompanying text (discussing how author's interest in
obtaining interpretive artists to perform author's work conflicts with author's personality
interests).
428. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 43 (stating that price of dissemination through
performance is that interpretive artists change author's original vision).
429. See Garon, supra note 49, at 279 n.11 (stating that producer is individual with most
immediate financial interest in success of production and presumably would want to protect
this interest).
430. See id. (same).
431. Id.
432. See id. at 284-85 (suggesting that community theater and touring companies repeatedly
face physical constraints and budget restrictions).
433. See Jerry Herman, Golly Gee Fellas (1963) (unpublished comments) (available in
Lincoln Center Branch of New York Public Library, cippings file, Copyright-Theater-U.S.)
(describing integrity rights violations that result from physical and monetary constraints). Jerry
Herman assessed the problem as follows:
Let's examine what happens to a musical a decade after its final Broadway curtain.
The Walla-Walla Music Tent opens its summer season with a big Met star in the
title role. Of course, she's never acted before, so the book is cut to ribbons. The
only thing resembling choreography she is able to face is a Gavotte she once did in
the "Marriage of Figaro" so ... she does the Gavotte. Those award winning sets,
once the talk of Broadway, have been replaced by canvas, rigging, and an audience
in the round and the costumes have been salvaged from the aforementioned pro-
duction of Figaro ....
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ing companies and community art groups repeatedly have to alter elements
of authors' performance art to accommodate budget restraints and space
limitations. 4 4 The distortions become even more extensive when an entre-
preneur produces an adaptation of a work of performance art.4"1 In such
instances, the extensive constraints that plague any medium-transfer can
result in almost overwhelming changes to authors' works. 436
The interpretive artist shares many of the same interests with the
performance art entrepreneur. Like the entrepreneur, the interpretive artist
has a financial stake in the production, albeit much smaller than that of
the entrepreneur. Further, the interpretive artists shares with the entrepreneur
the same interest in accommodating for physical and budgetary constraints
when performing or adapting the author's work.437 Interpretive artists also
have a strong First Amendment interest in self-expression that is second
only to the author 'S.431 Finally, interpretive artists working in an educational
setting have an unique interest that may compromise the author's moral
rights.43 9 In an educational setting interpretive artists are learning and
teaching the performance arts, and thus, federal moral rights legislation
must make some sort of accommodation for distortions that would otherwise
be intolerable in a professional context. 440
The final interested party to any moral rights legislation is the public
itself. Clearly, the public has a First Amendment interest in receiving the
author's message.441 The public also has a First Amendment interest in any
additional expression that the interpretive artist generates. 442 Finally, beyond
434. See id. (same); Garon, supra note 49, at 284-85 (suggesting that community theater
and touring companies repeatedly face physical constraints and budget restrictions).
435. See Practical Perspectives, supra note 13, at 64, 67-68 (discussing difficulties involved
in adapting work created for one medium to constraints of another medium).
436. See id. For instance, if an entrepreneur is adapting a work of performance art for
television or film, the constraints of these mediums will require serious modifications to the
author's work. Id. at 64. Take the example of a play adapted for television. A hour of
television must have four acts that each conclude with a piece of unresolved drama that will
bring the audience back after the commercials. Id. If the entrepreneur is adapting a stageplay
that has two acts, the adaption to television will require radical changes to the play. Id.
437. See Practical Perspectives, supra note 13, at 64, 67-68 (discussing modifications that
result from transferring work of performance art to constraints of another medium).
438. See supra notes 182-408 and accompanying text (reconciling performance art author
moral rights with interpretive artists' First Amendment interests).
439. See Garon, supra note 49, at 284 (stating that interpretive artists in university setting
need extensive artistic flexibility because interpretive process is educational experience for
students and professors).
440. See id. (same).
441. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1977) (stating that
where speaker imminently threatens to drown out other points of view, such that democratic
process and other First Amendment interests are threatened, courts will consider whether state
action to silence voice is appropriate); see also supra notes 220-63 and accompanying text
(discussing First Amendment and corrective view of moral rights).
442. See First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 789-90 (stating that where speaker imminently
threatens to drown out other points of view, such that democratic process and other First
Amendment interests are threatened, courts will consider whether state action to silence voice
is appropriate).
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any specific message of any one author, the public has an interest in the
overall health of the performing arts. 43 To return to the copyright clause,
federal moral rights recognition for the performing arts must promote the
performance arts.4"
V. BALANCING THE INTERESTS-DEVELOPING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR
FEDERAL MORAL RIGHTS LEGISLATION FOR PERFORMANCE ART AUTHORS
Any federal recognition of the performance art author's moral rights
should encompass the two components of the moral right: the author's
right of paternity and the author's right of integrity." 5 However, because
of the disparate impacts of these two components on the involved interests,
balancing them through statutory provisions must be done separately for
each component.
4 6
Implementing paternity rights into the present framework of American
law would be a simple and effective method to promote the useful arts. 447
Because correctly attributing authorship is easy and inexpensive," 8 perform-
ance art author paternity rights would not intrude on the financial interests
of interpretive artists or performance art entrepreneurs." 9 Further, attrib-
uting correct authorship to a work has little to do with the performance of
the work.4 0 Thus, a right of paternity for performance art authors would
have little effect on the expressive interests (First Amendment or otherwise)
of entrepreneurs or interpretive artists .
4 1
Because a paternity right fits comfortably within existing American law
and the performance art industry, the ancillary provisions effectuating the
right should be strong and effective. For instance, because recognition of
the performance art author 's paternity right is neither onerous nor expensive 2
and because it does not implicate the First Amendment, monetary damages
443. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that author's limited rights must promote
useful arts).
444. See id. (same).
445. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of paternity
right and integrity right).
446. See supra notes 182-418 and accompanying text (discussing impact of integrity and
paternity rights on First Amendment).
447. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 92 (stating that existing copyright law could easily
accommodate author's right of paternity); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (requiring
that Congress award exclusive rights to authors to promote useful arts). Indeed, American
moral rights analogues, specifically contract and unfair competition, already protect an author's
paternity rights to a limited extent. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 604-07 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding implicitly that if author's name is eliminated from his work, author has claim
under § 43(a) of Lanham Act that parallels paternity right).
448. See supra notes 278-81, 300-11 and accompanying text (discussing paternity right and
First Amendment).
449. See id. (same).
450. See id. (same).
451. See id. (same).
452. See id. (same).
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and injunctive relief would be appropriate means to enforce the right. 453
Congress' previous enactments support such enforcement mechanisms.
45 4
When Congress accorded paternity rights to visual art artists in 1990, with
the exception of criminal penalties, Congress afforded visual artists the full
panoply of legal and injunctive remedies available under the federal copy-
right laws.4 55 Because, paternity rights in the context of visual art and
performance art essentially have the same impact, Congress' paternity right
damage provisions for visual art artists are suitable equally for performance
art author paternity rights.
45 6
The comfortable fit between paternity rights, American law and the
performance art industry also argues for federal legislation prohibiting any
form of an inter vivos transfer of an author's paternity right.45 7 Absent
such a provision, the weak bargaining position of most performance art
authors would allow interpretive artists and entrepreneurs to coerce authors
into contracting away their paternity rights.458 Performance art authors' lack
of bargaining power45 9 also should make the paternity right nonwaveable.
4 °
453. See supra notes 278-81 & 300-11 and accompanying text (discussing paternity right
and First Amendment).
454. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, supra note 39 (according visual artists moral
rights).
455. See H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 22 (1990), reprinted in 1991 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & ADMwn. NEWS 6915, 6931-32 (stating that Visual Artists Act of 1990, with
exception of criminal penalties, provides full panoply of copyright remedies for visual art
artist's integrity rights violations).
456. See id. (same).
457. See infra note 458 and accompanying text (discussing inter vivos transfers of per-
formance art author paternity right); see also JIA, supra note 39, at 5129 (providing that
paternity rights for visual art artists "may not be transferred"); Marcus, The Moral Right in
Germany, 25 COPYMGHT L. Snn'. (ASCAP) 93, 113 (1975) (stating that German paternity
right is nontransferable); Reeves, Bauer & Lieser, Retained Rights of Authors, Artists and
Composers under French Law on Literary and Artistic Property, 14 J. ARTS MGrr. & L. 7,
16 (1985) (stating that French paternity right is inalienable).
458. See Practical Perspectives, supra note 13, at 43 (discussing enormous economic
pressures that interpretive artist and producers place on playwrights); Singer, supra note 49,
at 296 (suggesting that choreographers do not have adequate bargaining power to obtain
contractual protections); see also H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 18 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMaN. NEws 6915, 6928 (stating that Committee on
Judiciary recognizes that visual artists have weak bargaining position that may cause them to
bargain their rights away).
459. See Practical Perspectives, supra note 13, at 43 (discussing enormous economic
pressures that interpretive artist and producers place on playwrights); Singer, supra note 49,
at 296 (suggesting that choreographers do not have adequate bargaining power to obtain
contractual protections).
460. See Marcus, supra note 457, at 113 (reporting that German artist cannot contractually
waive paternity right). But cf. The JIA, supra note 39, at 5129 (1990) (providing that paternity
"rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in written instrument
signed by author"). See also H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 18 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 6915, 6928 (stating that though routine waivers
will eviscerate protections of Visual Artists Rights Act, nonwaiver would inhibit normal
commercial practices and would not avoid de facto waivers).
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Finally, because attribution of authorship is both easy and inexpensive and
does not implicate the expressive interests of the participants in performance
art to any great degree, 461 Congress, consistent with the durational limitations
of the copyright clause, could promote the useful arts by extending the
duration of the author's paternity right to a period coextensive with copy-
right: the life of the author plus fifty years. 462
While implementing a paternity right for performance art authors would
be a relatively simple matter, implementing a performance art author right
of integrity would be much more difficult. 463 Central to such an implemen-
tation is determining exactly what constitutes an integrity rights violation.
4
4
Once the scope of the integrity right is delineated, one can define ancillary
provisions to the integrity right that will effectively balance the disparate
interests involved." 5 Essentially, there are two approaches to defining an
integrity rights violation. The first approach defines the concept as those
distortions, mutilations or other modifications that harm the artist's "honor
or reputation. ' 46 Both the Berne Convention and Congress' 1990 visual
artists moral rights enactments use this approach. 4 7
The "honor or reputation" approach (Berne approach) uses a two part
analysis to identify an integrity rights violation. First, the interpretive artist
must modify the author's work.468 Second, the interpretive artist's modifi-
cation must harm the author's professional honor or reputation. 4" 9 Both
prongs of the test essentially are objective in that neither prong exclusively
relies on the author's testimony to determine whether either prong is
satisfied. 470 Rather, a court applying the Berne approach would look to
independent evidence to determine if the interpretive artist has modified an
461. See supra notes 278-81, 300-11 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment
and paternity right).
462. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1978) (stating that author's copyright endures for
term consisting of life of author and fifty years after author's death).
463. See supra notes 447-62 and accompanying text (discussing implementation of per-
formance art author paternity right).
464. See infra notes 465-499 and accompanying text (discussing various approaches to
defining integrity right); see also supra notes 220-63 and accompanying text (discussing
corrective view of moral rights).
465. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 40 (discussing importance of moral rights legislation
striking different balances among various interests, depending on type of moral right).
466. See Berne, supra note 30, at 6bis(1) (stating that author shall have right to "object
to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of" author's work that prejudices his
honor or reputation); see also JIA, supra note 39, at 5129 (providing that "the author of a
work of visual art ... shall have the right ... to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation,
or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation
467. Berne, supra note 30, at 6bis(l); JIA, supra note 39, at 5129.
468. See S. RircKETsoN, supra note 28, at 468 (stating that words "distortion, mutilation
or other modification" appear wide enough to cover any change that is made to actual work).
469. Id. at 471.
470. See id. at 468-71 (discussing basic objectivity of Berne approach to defining integrity
right).
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author's work in a manner that harms the authors's honor or reputation. 471
The advantages and disadvantages to the Berne approach primarily
reside in the second prong: an integrity rights violation must harm the
author's professional honor or reputation. The American judicial system is
familiar with this reputational standard, having applied it in the context of
libel for years. 47 However, other than the American judicial system's
familiarity with the second prong of the Berne approach, the approach has
serious disadvantages. 473 First, the second prong of the Berne Approach is
resoundingly pro-interpretive artist.474 Because many performance art authors
lack a public reputation, 475 in many cases it would be very difficult for
authors to demonstrate that a modification to their work has harmed their
professional reputations. 476 Further, even if an author has a reputational
interest, the public may perceive the distortion to the author's work as
benefiting the author's reputation rather than harming it. 47
The Berne approach's bias towards the interpretive artist is symptomatic
of the test's more fundamental flaw-the test does not directly protect the
personality interests of the author. 478 Instead of focusing on the performance
art author's psyche, the Berne approach ultimately protects the artist's
economic interests, 47 9 an interest many artists do not have.40 Thus, the
second prong of the Berne approach effectively forestalls the performance
471. See H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 15-16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG., & ADhnN. NEws 6915, 6925-26 (stating harm to visual artist's professional
reputation may be proven through use of expert testimony).
472. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1963) (discussing Alabama law
defining "libelous per se" as tending "to injure a person ... in his reputation"). But see
H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEws 6915, 6925 (stating that "honor or reputation" standard of Visual Artists Rights Act is
not standard analogous to that of defamation case).
473. See infra notes 474-81 and accompanying text (discussing problems plaguing Berne
approach).
474. See infra notes 475-81 and accompanying text (discussing why Berne approach is
pro-interpretive artist).
475. See Davis, supra note 28, at 358 (suggesting that past devoid of commercial success
weakens artist's chance of demonstrating that integrity rights violation harmed professional
reputation).
476. See id. (suggesting that under Berne approach to defining integrity right, many artists
would have trouble demonstrating harm to professional reputation).
477. See S. RICKETSON, supra note 28, at 472 (stating that in some circumstances
modifications to author's work may falsely enhance author's reputation).
478. See supra notes 473-77 and infra notes 479-80 accompanying text (discussing why
Berne approach to defining integrity tight violation does not protect author's personality
interests).
479. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 37 (suggesting that economic approach to moral
rights defines integrity right violation in terms of harm to author's reputation); Note, supra
note 28, at 477 (describing economic conception of moral rights); see also supra note 28
(discussing inability of economic approach to protect author's personality interests).
480. See Davis, supra note 28, at 358 (suggesting many artists do not have professional
reputation).
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art author's recovery for many serious violations to the author's personality
interests. 4 1
Another approach to defining an integrity rights violation is the German
approach which defines an integrity violation as a distortion or mutilation
to an author's work that "prejudice[s] [the author's] lawful ... personal
interests" (German approach). 482 Like the Berne approach, the German
approach has a two part test that has the same first prong: the author must
demonstrate that the interpretive artist has modified the author's work in
some fashion. 483 As in the Berne approach, this prong is essentially an
objective test, not requiring the court to rely solely on the author's belief
that the interpretive artist has modified the author's work.484 The German
approach breaks with the Berne approach, however, in the second prong
wherein the author'must demonstrate that the modification prejudices his
personal interests.A4
The second prong of the German approach is a much more subjective
test than the "honor and reputation" prong of the Berne approach, 416 and
herein lies the strength and weakness of the German approach.417 By
divorcing the author's integrity interests from the author's economic inter-
ests, the "prejudice" prong of the German approach defines an integrity
violation much more accurately41s However, the "prejudice" prong also
runs the risk of becoming a completely subjective standard that inordinately
favors the performance art author.4 9 "[Ilnevitably [the author will] be the
481. See Tamarind Lithography Workshop, Inc. v. Sanders, 143 Cal. App. 3d 571, 576-
78, 193 Cal. Rptr. 409, 412 (1983) (observing that lost profits are difficult to quantify when
film owner refused to give film producer contracted credit). Georges Michaelides-Nouaros has
summarized the shortcomings of the Berne approach in the following fashion:
The [honor and reputation standard] is clearly .. .unsatisfactory ... as the right
to respect for the integrity of the work includes protection not only against modi-
fications that might be prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation, but also
against any other modification or use of the work that is contrary to his intellectual
interests . . ., his personal style or his literary, artistic or scientific conceptions.
Micha61ids-Nouaros, Protection of the Author's Moral Interests after his Death as a Cultural
Postulate, 15 CoPYR IGHT 35, 37 (1979) (emphasis added).
482. Marcus, supra note 457, at 102.
483. See id. (stating that German approach prohibits alterations to author's work).
484. See id. at 102-03 (stating that because German courts apply their integrity right in
objective fashion, artist's belief that his interests have been prejudiced does not suffice to
constitute integrity rights violation).
485. See id. (stating that integrity rights violation is any distortion or other mutilation of
work which would prejudice artist's personal interests).
486. See id. at 102 (stating that German commentators consider German approach broader
in application than Berne approach); S. RicKMsoN, supra note 28, at 471 (stating that prejudice
to author's "personal interests" would raise more subjective issues than prejudice to "honor
and reputation").
487. See infra notes 488-499 and accompanying text (discussing strengths and weaknesses
of German approach).
488. See supra note 28 (discussing inadequacies of economic approach to moral rights).
489. Marcus, supra note 457, at 102-03. Even the German courts have recognized the
subjectivity inherent in their approach to defining an integrity violation and have attempted
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best judge of what affects him in relation to his work, '" 49° and therefore,
the objective, rather than subjective, test of prejudice to the author used
in the German approach raises the specter of countless numbers of successful
integrity right claims based solely on the whims of the performance art
author.
491
If these easy judgments for the author were coupled with monetary and
injunctive remedies, the chill to the performance art industry could be
overwhelming. 492 While performance art producers are wealthy compared to
performance art authors, the vast majority of producers nonetheless operate
in a fragile economic environment. 493 A single monetary judgment or in-
junction could put a producer permanently out. of business.4 9 Such an
outcome would harm every interest involved in the performing arts. The
performance art author permanently would lose a means of communicating
his message to the public as well as a potential source of income.495 The
entrepreneur and interpretive artist would lose money and the opportunity
to express themselves 4 96 and the public would see less performance art.4
Further, the mere prospect of authors obtaining monetary or injunctive
relief solely on the basis of their personal whims would discourage many
interpretive artists from exercising their free speech rights when performing
an author's work of performance art.49 Indeed, such a subjective approach
to defining an integrity rights violation might even discourage individuals
from even attempting to perform performance art.49
Clearly then, the German approach's ability to accurately define an
integrity violation carries with it the potential to seriously harm the per-
formance art industry.50 Thus, its use in any federal legislation protecting
to interpret the second prong in a more objective fashion. Id. Further, German commentators
have suggested that prejudice to "personal interest" covers the same territory as the Berne
approach's "honor or reputation" standard. Id. at 102.
490. S. RIcKrETsoN, supra note 28, at 471.
491. See Marcus, supra note 457, at 102-03 (recognizing weakness of German approach).
492. See supra notes 269-77, 293-299 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment
chill resulting from coupling integrity rights legislation with monetary damages and injunctive
relief).
493. See Garon, supra note 49, at 277 (discussing economic health of New York theater).
494. See id. (same).
495. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 42-43 (stating that author has interest in disseminating
his ideas through performance of his work).
496. See Garon, supra note 49, at 279 n.ll (stating that producer is individual with most
immediate financial interest in success of production and presumably would want to protect
this interest).
497. See supra notes 246-63 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment and
corrective view of moral rights).
498. See supra notes 269-77, 293-299 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment
chill that would result from coupling corrective view of moral rights with monetary damages
or injunctive relief).
499. See id. (same).
500. See supra notes 489-499 and accompanying text (discussing how German approach
could harm performance art industry).
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the integrity rights of performance art authors is problematic 0' Nonetheless,
a legislative scheme could use the German approach to define a moral rights
violation and effectively accommodate all of the disparate interests in the
performance art industry if two provisos were added.2 First, legislation
using the German approach must direct the courts to strictly apply the first
prong of the German approach. Specifically, courts must ascertain whether
an interpretive artist has modified an author's work solely by comparing
the particular performance at issue to the "four comers" of the author's
work of performance art.-°3 The author's "work of performance art"
encompasses the author's fixed expression, including a script or a musical
score, provided that the author intended the fixed expression to be a
"blueprint" from which interpretive artists could create a fully realized
work of performance art.04 Only when an interpretive artist modifies an
ascertainable element of the author's fixed expression could a court find an
actionable integrity violation.
This strict approach to identifying actionable modifications to a per-
formance art author's work ensures that the law only would hold interpretive
artist's responsible for real diversions from an author's expression, as
opposed to holding them liable for bad interpretive choices. 05 Where the
author's work is silent, an interpretive artist's expressive conduct within
those areas cannot violate the author's integrity rights, and thus, receives
First Amendment protection.51 6 The "four comers" rule is the first step to
501. See id. (same).
502. See infra notes 503-06 and accompanying text (discussing "four comers" rule and
labeling).
503. See BLAcK's LAW DICTONARY 591 (5th ed. 1979) (defining term "four corners"-
face of written instrument); see also Freedman, supra note 3, at C21, col. I (stating that rather
than altering Samuel Beckett's play, if Boston ART wanted play in subway, Boston ART
should have written play that takes place in subway).
504. See J. MUIER, supra note 1, at 34 (stating that tixt of work of performance art
exists in two capacities: (1) as guide to produce performance; and (2) as authenticating device
whose purpose is to provide system of identification that allows one to say that particular
performance is instance of work in question).
505. See supra notes 503-04, infra notes 506-07 and accompanying text (discussing "four
comers" rule).
506. See supra notes 246-63 and accompanying text (discussing corrective view of moral
rights). The "four corners" not only delineates the interpretive artist's responsibilities, but it
also allows performance art authors to control the interpretive latitude that collaborative artists
can exercise when performing the author's work. See Freedman, supra note 3, at C21, col. 1
(suggesting that author's text provides parameters for interpretive artist's expressive conduct).
The more detailed an author's "blueprint," the less interpretive latitude exists for the collab-
orative artist. For instance, Eugene O'Neill's plays are very complete in their expression. See
E. O'NEL, LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTo NiOHT (Yale University Press 1955) (containing great
deal of playwright direction). O'Neill specifically describes his character's appearances, what
the sets must look like and a great deal of the stage business. Thus, O'Neill's plays leave little
interpretive latitude in these areas. In contrast, William Shakespeare's plays explicitly specify
little beyond the basic verse, thereby affording much more interpretive latitude. See BARTON,
PLAYiNG SHAmPAR 6-7 (Methuen 1984) (discussing Shakespeare's hidden direction to actors
contained in his works). Thus, when performing works like William Shakespeare's, the
interpretive artists has much more latitude in which to independently speak to the audience.
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a balanced application of the German approach to defining an integrity
violation.
However, by itself, the "four comers" rule would never create a balance
among all of the involved interests.s °7 The subjective nature of the second
prong to the German approach would still permit a multiplicity of integrity
right actions that would overwhelm the performance art industryses Thus,
to reach an effective balance of interests, another legislative limitation on
the German approach is necessary. Limiting the author's remedy for an
integrity right violation to a "labeling" remedy, in conjunction with the
"four comers" rule, would create the appropriate balance among all of the
involved interests within the performance art industry.109
A labeling remedy for an integrity right violation would involve a court
ordering the producer and/or the interpretive artist to indicate in the
performance's credits and/or advertisements that the interpretive artist has
modified the author's work against the wishes of the author.510 Such a
remedy in large part would avoid both economic and expressive chill to the
performing arts, while still protecting the integrity interests of performance
art authors 511 For the producers of performance art, compliance with a
labeling order would be a relatively inexpensive task.5 1 2 Further, while
compliance with a labeling order might be inconvenient for the producer,
507. See infra note 508 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacies of "four comer"
rule).
508. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text (discussing numerous potential integrity
right violations in any one performance and First Amendment chill this can cause if legislation
couples integrity right with severe remedy).
509. See Amarnick, supra note 13, at 52 (discussing advantages of labeling remedy); Katz,
The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law-a Proposal, 24 So. CAL. L. REv.
375, 403 (1951) (stating that labeling approach "is not intended to put an author's work in a
literary strait jacket-but to save him from taking the responsibility for a work which is not
as he intended it").
510. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 52 (defining labeling remedy); see also supra note
312 and accompanying text (defining labeling remedy). A labeling remedy might require the
producer and/or the interpretive artist to elucidate in the credits and advertisements precisely
what aspects of the author's work have been modified. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 52
(discussing nature of labeling remedy). In one French case, where the set designer's sets were
removed from production of opera, the court ordered that all future advertisements and credits
contain the words, "[t]he settings for the Crossing of the Arals were deleted because this scene
was suppressed." Leger v. Reunion des Theatres Lyriques Naturaux, reprinted in Marvin, The
Author's Status in the United Kingdom and France: Common Law and the Moral Right
Doctrine, 20 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 675, 695 (1971). However, such precise descriptions of
wrongful modifications to an author's work may be unduly burdensome on the performance
art entrepreneur if required in every advertisement, especially given the fact that the requisite
terseness of such a description communicates very little to the public. Such fuller explanations
should be limited to the credits of a performance of the author's work.
511. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 52-53 (discussing benefits of labeling remedy); see
also supra notes 315-84 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment chill and labeling
remedy).
512. See supra notes 315-84 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment chill and
labeling).
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it might actually increase the production's profits through the public con-
troversy that labeling tends to engender."s3 Most importantly, a labeling
remedy does not prevent the producer or the interpretive artist from pro-
ceeding with their intended performance.
5 14
In addition to serving the interests of the performance art entrepreneur
and the interpretive artists, the labeling remedy also serves the interest of
the public in that both the author's message and the interpretive artist's
message reach the public."1 ' Indeed, because the labeling remedy increases
dialogue and the amount of information that enters the market place of
ideas, the remedy actually would promote the public's First Amendment
interests.51 6
As for the author, while labeling does not stop the integrity rights
violation from occurring,5 1 7 the remedy does allow the author to commu-
nicate his message to the public and disassociate himself from the perform-
ance without destroying a future means to perform his works.51 s Further,
the labeling approach allows the author to maintain some control over the
personality interests contained in his work.519 Finally, the labeling approach
has the added benefit of allowing more latitude for pro-author ancillary
provisions within performance art author moral rights legislation. For
instance, inalienable performance art author integrity rights would be much
more onerous for the performance art industry if moral rights legislation
did not limit the remedy for an integrity rights violation to labeling.
20
513. The profits that the film The Last Temptation of Christ and 2 Live Crew's record
Nasty as They Want to Be have garnered suggest that labeling a work only increases public
interest and profits. See Bell, supra note 327, at 6, col. 1. (stating that controversy surrounding
The Last Temptation of Christ increased film's profits); Browne, supra note 327, at 26, col.
1 (stating that 2 Live Crew's record has made millions as result of labeling and police
harassment). There is certainly a counterarguement, however, that labeling will cause the public
to lose interest in a performance of an author's work, thereby reducing the performance's
economic potential. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 53 (stating that labeling might reduce
economic potential of production).
514. See supra note 317 and accompanying text (discussing labeling and prior restraints).
515. Hughes, supra note 16, at 359 ; see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435
U.S. 765, 789-90 (1977) (stating where speaker imminently threatens to drown out other points
of view, such that democratic process and other First Amendment interests are threatened,
courts will consider whether state action to silence intrusive voice is appropriate); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 & 400 (1968) (stating that where legislative
findings or record demonstrate that one voice is silencing others to detriment of First
Amendment interests, state may take corrective measures).
516. See supra notes 315-84 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment chill and
labeling remedy).
517. See Amarnick, supra note 22, at 56 (stating that labeling is imperfect remedy for
author because he must tolerate interpretive artist's continuing integrity rights violation).
518. Id. at 53.
519. Id.
520. See H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 15-16, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6915, 6928 (stating that waivers are normal American commercial
practice).
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CONCLUSION
With the enactment of the Visual Artist's Act of 1990, Congress took
the first significant step towards a cohesive system of federal moral rights
laws. 5 21 Federal recognition of performance art author moral rights could
be the next step. Current moral rights analogues for performance art authors
are inadequate, 522 and a real need exists for a system of federal law protecting
the personality interests of performance art authors. s25 While interfacing
such protection into our present legal and commercial systems would be a
complex task, as this article has demonstrated, it is not an impossible one.
Once one overcomes the initial hurdle of contemplating a non-economic
author's right,52 the chief obstacles revolve around reconciling a perform-
ance art author's moral right with our strong free speech tradition s25 and
the economic constraints of the performance art industry.526 This article has
demonstrated that if Congress carefully fashions the basic moral right and
its associated remedies, the performance art author's moral right actually
can promote our tradition of free speech' 27 as well as the health of our
performance art industry.s28
OTTO W. KoNAD**
521. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, supra note 39 (according visual artists moral
rights).
522. See supra notes 35-154 and accompanying text (discussing performance art moral
rights analogues and their inadequacies).
523. See supra notes 2-21 and accompanying text (discussing need for performance art
author moral right).
524. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text (defining performance art author moral
right).
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moral right and how they accommodate disparate interests).
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As used in this act
(1) Author: means an individual who has created a work of performance
art.
(2) Parody: means a work in which the language or style of another
work is imitated or mimicked for comic effect or ridicule.
(3) Performance: means a public presentation of the author's work of
performance art in which individuals perform the author's work of
performance art.
(4) Public Communication: means any intentional communication, made
to more than one person, concerning the author's work of perform-
ance art or performance of the author's work of performance art.
Public communications include, but are not limited to: Credits,
programs, print and electronic media advertisements, and posters.
(5) Rehearsal: means a private presentation of the author's work of
performance art in which individuals practice performing the au-
thor's work, in preparation for a performance.
(6) Satire: means a work which holds the vices or shortcomings of an
individual or institution up to ridicule or derision.
(7) Work of Performance Art: means a fixed, self-contained artistic
creation that also acts as its author's intended guide for individuals
to perform the work.
(a) A work of performance art does not include works of per-
formance art that are "works made for hire" as defined in
Title 17 U.S.C. Section 101.
Commentary
Subdivisions (2) & (6) - The definitions of satire and parody are taken
in large part from the case Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat
Cinema, 467 F. Supp. 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prod., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 357
(N.D. Ga. 1979).
Subdivision (7) - American recognition of moral rights must proceed
in a piece meal fashion, being careful to individually balance the disparate
interests within the different disciplines of the arts. Section 1-101's definition
of "Work of Performance Art" is responsive to this concern. The term
has a narrowly constructed meaning that is meant to significantly limit the
scope of this Act.
To qualify as a "work of performance art" the work must be a. fixed,
self-contained artistic expression that an observer can enjoy without the
benefit of experiencing an actual performance of the work. Further, the
author must intend the work to be a guide for other artists to create a fully
realized performance of the author's Work. Examples of works of perform-
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ance art could include, but are not limited to: Sheet music, play scripts,
screenplays and video taped or filmed choreography. Note that to qualify
as a "work of performance art," an electronically recorded performance
must have been recorded with the intent to use the recording as guide for
subsequent productions of the work.
Subdivision (7)(a) - Performance art that is created as "work made
for hire," as defined in Title 17 U.S.C. Section 101, does not qualify as a
"work of performance art" under this Act. This limitation reflects the fact
that artistic works that are created as "work made for hire" often have
vast numbers of contributors to the finished work. In such cases, it is
meaningless to apply the designation "author" to any of these contributors.
Arguably, there is no author, or the author is the employer/producing
organization who guides and controls these contributors. Such an entity
lacks the psyche or "personality interests" that attribution and integrity
rights seek to protect.
Article 2
Author's Rights
Section 2-101. The Author's Right of Attribution.
(1) The author shall have the right of attribution, which shall encompass
the author's right:
(a) To claim authorship of any work of performance art that the
author creates.
(b) To prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any
work of performance art which he or she did not create.
(2) The author's right of attribution shall extend to any and all per-
formances of the author's work of performance art.
Commentary
A performance art author's ability to get his or her works produced
depends to a large extent on the commercial and artistic success of the
author's previous works. Where the author has not received appropriate
credit for his past works, the critical and financial success of these works,
no matter how extensive, will do little to help the author get his subsequent
works produced. Section 2-101 ensures that an author receives this vital
attribution where appropriate. As a result, Section 2-101 protects the au-
thor's economic interests more than any other provision in this act.
Section 2-101(1)(a) confers on a performance art author the right to
claim authorship of any work of performance art that the author creates.
Conversely, section 2-101(1)(b) confers on a performance art author the
right to prevent third parties from attributing authorship to the author for
a work that the author did not create. Note Section 2-101(2) extends the
author's right of attribution to all performances of the author's work of
performance art. Thus, whenever an author's fixed work of performance
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art is performed, the author has the right to have his authorship of the
fixed work attributed to the author.
Section 2-101 does not give the author the right to deny authorship of
his work where the work is distorted, mutilated or modified. This remedy,
often called the right of withdrawal, is not commensurate with the wrong
it seeks to correct. Distortions, mutilations or other modifications to an
author's work may not be attributable to the author, but a great deal of
the undistorted work can be attributed to the author. To allow the author
to disown work he has created in addition to the modified portions is
deceptive and unduly prejudices the producer's interests. A statutory re-
sponse to unauthorized modifications to the performance art author's works
is better left to the more particularized rights and remedies afforded by the
integrity rights provisions of this act.
Section 2-102. The Author's Right of Integrity.
(1) The author shall have the right of integrity, which shall encompass
the author's right:
(a) To prevent any distortion, mutilation, or other modification
to the author's work of performance art.
(2) The author's right of integrity shall extend to any and all perform-
ances of the author's work of performance art.
Commentary
The primary purpose of Section 2-102 is to prevent emotional harm to
the author resulting from unauthorized distortions, mutilations or other
modifications to the author's performance art. Section 2-102 effectuates this
goal by affording the author the right to prevent any distortion, mutilation
or other modification to the author's work.
Because a performance art author's creation is relatively free from the
constraints of economy, efficiency and physical environment, the author
can inject a great deal of his or her personality into the creation. However,
the author's freedom to inject his or her personality into his or her art is
a double edged sword for the author. Because performance art is largely
free from the constraints of economy, efficiency and physical environment,
individuals other than the author can easily distort or modify a work of
performance art. When a performance art author's works are distorted or
modified, the manifestation of the author's personality is modified such
that the author suffers emotional harm.
Because Section 2-102 concerns itself with protecting the performance
art author's psyche, it's provisions do not define an integrity rights violation
in terms of a modification to the author's work that harms the author's
reputation or honor. Such an approach protects the author's economic
interests, but in many cases, does little to protect the author's emotional
interests. This is primarily because many modifications to a performance
art author's work will not harm the author's reputation or honor, but will
harm the author's psyche.
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Admittedly, Section 2-102 defines the performance art author's integrity
right in a very subjective fashion; however, a satisfactory balance among
the disparate interests within the performance art industry is created when
Section 2-102 is applied in conjunction with the other provisions of this
Act.
The secondary purposes of Section 2-102 include preserving our artistic
heritage, protecting the performance art author's economic interests and
ensuring that the public receives the message that a performance art author
communicates through his or her works.
Note that Section 2-102 extends the author's right of integrity to include
all performances of the author's work of performance art. Thus, whenever
the author's work of performance art is performed, the- author shall have
the right to ensure that the performance does not divert from the author's
fixed work.
Article 3
Scope and Exercise of Rights
Section 3-101. Scope and Exercise of Rights of Attribution and Integrity.
Only the author of a work of performance art has the rights that
this Act confers, whether or not the author owns the copyright for
the work.
(a) Joint authors of a work of performance art are co-owners of
the attribution and integrity rights that this act confers. Each
co-owner independently may exercise his or her attribution and
integrity rights.
Commentary
Section 3-101 confers on the performance art author attribution and
integrity rights that exist independently of copyright ownership. Thus, when
a performance art author transfers the copyright to the author's work to
another individual, the author will still retain attribution and integrity rights.
Subdivision (a) - Joint authors of a work of performance art may
exercise their attribution and integrity rights with or without the cooperation
of the work's other joint author(s).
Article 4
Duration of Rights
Section 4-101. Duration of Rights of Attribution and Integrity.
The rights that this Act confers shall endure for the life of the
author.
(a) In the case of a work of performance art prepared by two or
more authors, the rights that this Act confers shall endure
solely for the life of the last surviving author.
Commentary
Because this act primarily concerns itself with protecting the psyche of
performance art authors, Section 4-101 limits the duration of the author's
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rights of attribution and integrity to the life of the author. At death, a
performance art author's psyche no longer exists and thus, needs no further
protection.
Section 4-101 also complies with the Constitutional mandate that Con-
gress shall only confer exclusive rights to authors for limited periods of
time. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Article 5
Transfer and Waiver
Section 5-101. Transfer and Waiver of Rights of Attribution and Integrity.
The protections, rights, causes of action or remedies that this Act
affords the author cannot be waived or transferred.
Commentary
Section 5-101 forecloses the author or anyone else from transferring or
waiving the protections, rights, causes of action or remedies that this act
affords the performance art author. While an author may of his own
volition forgo pursuing his rights under this act, such forbearance will not
constitute a transfer or waiver of those rights. Further, such forbearance
will not prevent the author, at some later date, from asserting his rights
under this act.
Section 5-101's purpose is to forestall the entrepreneurial aspects of the
performance art industry from using their superior bargaining position to
force performarce art authors from contracting away their protections under
this act.
Article 6
Attribution and Integrity Rights Enforcement
Section 6-101. Enforcement of Rights of Attribution and Integrity.
An author may bring an action in federal court to enforce the




Section 7-101. Remedies for Enforcement of Rights of Attribution.
In any action to enforce the author's rights of attribution, the
author:
(a) May recover actual damages. The author's recovery shall be
limited to reasonable compensation based on proof of lost
earnings, diminished earning capacity, lost profits, loss of
commercial value, or any other pecuniary loss that proximately
results from the infringement of the author's attribution rights.
(b) May obtain temporary and permanent injunctions to prevent
or restrain violations of the author's attribution rights.
The author's remedies for enforcement of his or her rights of
attribution shall be limited to those described above in subparts (a)
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Commentary
Section 7-101 affords the performance art author strong remedies for
attribution rights violations in that the provision allows the performance
art author to recover both actual damages and injunctive relief. The strength
of this remedy reflects the economic significance of proper attribution for
the performance art author. The remedy's strength also reflects the marginal
impact that the attribution right places on the performance art industry.
Attribution rights inflict very little financial hardship on interpretive artists
or the entrepreneurs involved in the performing arts. In most cases, correct
attribution of authorship is easy and inexpensive. Further, attributing correct
authorship to a work has little to do with the performance of the work.
As a result an attribution right for performance art authors has little effect
on the expressive interests (First Amendment or otherwise) of entrepreneurs
or interpretive artists within the performing arts.
Section 7-102. Remedies for Enforcement of Integrity Rights.
In any action to enforce an author's rights of integrity, the author:
(a) May obtain, without cost to the author, reasonable space within
any public communication that the defendant or the defen-
dant's instrumentalities publish pertaining to the author's work
of performance art or performance of the author's work of
performance art. The author may use this space to convey that
the particular copy or performance of the author's work does
not accord with the author's intent. Reasonable space to make
this communication shall vary in relation to the nature and
size of the public communication.
The author's remedies for enforcement of his or her integrity rights
shall be limited to those described above in subpart (a) of section
7-102.
Commentary
Section 7-102 limits a performance art author's remedies to enforce
integrity rights to a labeling remedy. There are no provisions for either
monetary or injunctive relief within Section 7-102. Instead the author may
obtain reasonable space in a defendant's public communications, pertaining
to the author's performance art, to inform the public that a particular copy
or performance of the author's performance art does not accord with
author's intent. Such reasonable space shall be provided without cost to the
author.
In determining what constitutes reasonable space within a particular
public communication, Section 7-102 directs the courts to consider the
nature and size of the communication. That is, the courts should grant
authors as much space as possible to communicate their message without
unduly destroying the character and usefulness of a particular public com-
munication. For instance, pin-on buttons advertising the film version of an
author's play provide very little space for anything beyond the film's title
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and perhaps a little art. To allot an author any space on such a button to
communicate his or dissatisfaction with the film would destroy the character
of the button as well as its usefulness. On the other hand, the credits to a
film essentially provide the author with unlimited space to communicate to
the public. Further, such communication does little to disrupt the integrity
of the film or its credits. Thus, a court might grant an author a larger
portion space in the film credits to communicate the author's dissatisfaction.
The unique and limited scope of Section 7-102 is in part a response to
the delicate balance of interests within the performance art industry. Section
2-102 of this Act, defines an integrity rights violation in an extremely
subjective fashion, essentially any distortion, mutilation or other modifica-
tion to the author's work. This definition accurately encompasses the
auth6r's personality interests that this Act seeks to protect. However, in
application, such a definition could lead to a multitude of law suits that
would impose overwhelming hardship on the performance art industry,
particularly if the subjective definition were coupled with monetary or
injunctive relief. Section 7-102's labeling remedy is calculated to remove a
great deal of this hardship while still allowing the performance art author
a meaningful method of enforcing his or her integrity rights.
In addition to maintaining the balance of interests within the perform-
ance art industry, Section 7-102's labeling remedy is also calculated to
accommodate the First Amendment rights of the producers and interpretive
artists who perform performance art. Unlike attribution rights, an author
who asserts his or her integrity rights can directly interfere with the manner
in which producers and performers of performance art express themselves.
This First Amendment issue requires that any relief for integrity rights
enforcement be carefully tailored to interfere as little as possible with the
producer's and interpretive artist's expression. Thus, injunctive relief, whether
temporary or permanent, has been excluded from the range of remedies
available under Section 7-102.
Section 7-103. Attorney's Fees.
Any author who brings a successful suit under this Act or who
reaches a settlement with the defendant after filing a complaint
under this Act, shall collect attorney fees and court costs from the
defendant provided the author demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence that:
(a) prior to filing his complaint the author contacted the defendant
and made a good faith, reasonable attempt to persuade the
defendant to cease violating the author's attribution or integrity
rights.
Commentary
The purpose of this provision is simple. Due to the relative poverty of
most performance art authors, and the limited monetary awards available
under this Act, the Act must have a provision that awards attorney fees to
an author who wins a suit brought pursuant to this act or settles after filing
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a complaint. Absent such a provision, the act might never be enforced.
To discourage a performance art counterpart to corporate strike suits
and to encourage the extra-judicial resolution of disputes involving moral
rights violations, Section 7-103 conditions the award of attorney fees on
the performance art author approaching the defendant prior to commencing
the suit and attempting to persuade the defendant to cease his wrongful
activities. The author must perform such attempts in good faith.
Article 8
Fair Use; Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 8-101. Fair Use.
(1) The defendant to any action brought under this Act may assert
the privilege of fair use, as provided for in Title 17 U.S.C.
Section 107.
(2) The fair use privilege is inapplicable in the following situations:
(a) Where the defendant commits an attribution or integrity
violation while using more of the author's work of per-
formance art than is absolutely necessary to recall or
conjure up the author's work of performance art.
(b) Where the defendant performs a satire or parody of the
author's work of performance art that lacks some critical
comment or statement about the author's work of per-
formance art that reflects the original perspective of the
parodist or satirist.
Commentary
Section 8-101(1) imports the federal fair use privilege from federal
copyright law to federal protection of performance art author's rights of
attribution and integrity. In the context of attribution and integrity rights,
the fair use privilege excludes certain limited uses of author's performance
art from liability. These uses shall include using limited portions of the
author's performance art for news reporting, teaching, scholarship, criticism
and comment. (Criticism and comment encompass parody and satire.)
Facially, attribution, and in particular, integrity rights appear to conflict
with this fair use privilege. For instance, the author's integrity rights protect
the performance art author's personality interest from harmful distortions
to an author's work, while fair use permits certain kinds of serious distortion
to the author's work, including parodies and satires.
However, Section 8-101(2) imports and codifies several common law
restrictions on fair use that the federal courts have developed for copyright
applications of the privilege. These restrictions substantially reduce the
tension between fair use and the author's integrity and attribution rights.
The first of these two limitations is the "recall or conjure up" test. Section
1652
PERFORMANCE ART AUTHOR RIGHTS
8-801(2)(a) provides that where a defendant commits an integrity or attri-
bution violation while using more of the author's work than is necessary
to conjure up or recall the author's work, the fair use privilege will not
protect the defendant from liability under this act. Thus, where the defen-
dant performs a version of the author's work that only slightly differs from
the author's fixed work, fair use will not protect a defendant for an integrity
or attribution violation. See Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Berlin v. E.C. Pub. Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Benny v. Lowe's Inc., 239 F.2d
532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1959);
Lowe's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal.
1955).
Note that determining what constitutes using more of the author's work
than is necessary to conjure up or recall the author's work will vary in
relation to what type of limited use the defendant is engaging in. Obviously
more of the author's work will have to be utilized if the defendant is doing
a parody of the author's work than if the defendant utilizes the author's
work for the purposes of criticism.
The second limitation on the fair use privilege that Section 8-101(2)(b)
imports from copyright law to this Act concerns performing a parody or
satire of the author's work of performance art. Any parody or satire of an
author's work performance art claiming the protection of fair use privilege
must "do more than merely achieve a comic effect. It must also make some
critical comment or statement about the original work which reflects the
original perspective of the parodist [or satirist] - thereby giving the parody
[or satire] social value beyond its entertainment function." Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prod., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351
(1979); see also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 467 F.
Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Section 8-102. Limitations on Actions.
All claims brought under this Act shall be barred unless the author
commences his action within a federal district court of competent
jurisdiction within one year of the alleged violation of the author's
integrity or attribution rights.
Section 8-103. Pleadings.
Whenever an author brings an action under this act:
(a) To enforce the author's rights of integrity, the author shall
describe with particularity the following in his or her complaint:
(1) Those portions of the author's work of performance art
that have been distorted, mutilated or modified;
(2) The distortions, mutilations or other modifications that
the author objects to;
(3) The time and place where the distortions, mutilations or
other modifications are occurring.
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Commentary
Section 8-103 requires the author to plead with great specificity when
bringing an integrity rights enforcement action under this Act. Specifically,
the author must delineate: (1) those portions of his fixed work that have
been distorted; (2) the actual distortions, mutilations or modifications that
the author is objecting to; and (3) the time and place where these distortions,
mutilations or modifications are occurring.
These provisions enable and implicitly direct the courts to use a con-
structionalist approach to identifying integrity rights violations. That is, the
courts are to ascertain whether an interpretive artist has modified an author's
work solely by comparing the particular performance at issue to the "four
comers" of the author's fixed work of performance art. Only when a
defendant modifies an ascertainable element of the author's fixed work,
can a court find an integrity violation. The pleading requirements specified
in Section 8-103 will ensure that courts and juries have the means to apply
this constructionalist approach.
When coupled with the Section 7-102 labeling remedy, Section 8-103
effectively will counterbalance the subjectivity of the author's integrity right,
as defined by Section 3-102, thereby limiting the detrimental financial and
creative impact that this Act has on the performance art producers and
interpretive artists. Producers and interpretive artist will only be held re-
sponsible under this Act for actual diversions from the author's fixed work.
Where the author's work is silent, an interpretive artist's expressive conduct
within those areas will not violate the author's integrity rights.
Section 8-104. Author's Right of Access to Rehearsals and Performances.
The author shall have a right of reasonable access to all rehearsals
and performances of the author's works of performance art.
Commentary
Section 8-104 is intended to counter a pragmatic difficulty for the
author attempting to enforce his or her integrity rights under this Act.
Because most productions of performance art have short runs and because
Section 7-102's labeling remedy is contingent on the defendant issuing public
communications pertaining to the production, an author's action for an
integrity rights violation often will face dismissal for mootness. By the time
the author has a judgment, the production at issue will have ended and the
defendant will no longer be issuing any public communications regarding
the production for the author to label.
Section 8-104 partially counters this difficulty by permitting the author
reasonable access to all rehearsals and performances of the author's work,
thereby affording the author an opportunity to obtain notice of potential
integrity rights violations.
Section 8-105. Burden of Proof.
Unless specified otherwise, the burden of proof under this Act shall
be by a preponderance of evidence.
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Section 8-106. Applicability and Effective Date.
(1) The rights created by this Act shall apply to works of performance
art created before or after the effective date of this act, as set forth
in subsection (2).
(2) The effective date of this Act shall be one year after the enactment
of this Act.
Section 8-107. Preemption.
On or after the effective date set forth in Section 8-106, all state
legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the rights
conferred by this Act are governed exclusively by federal law.
Thereafter no person is entitled to any such rights or equivalent
rights in any work of performance art under the common law or
statutes of any state. Nothing in this Section annuls or limits any
rights or remedies under the common law or state statutes with
respect to:
(a) Any cause of action from undertakings commenced before the
effective date, as set forth in Section 8-106 of this Act.
(b) Activities violating state legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any rights conferred by this Act.
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